The SCC in R v J.J.: Upholding the Constitutionality of Criminal Code Reforms which Remove Barriers that Deter Sexual Assault Complainants from Reporting

By: Caitlin Salvino

On June 23rd, 2022 the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) released its decision in R v J.J..[1] This 6–3 ruling upheld the constitutionality of recent amendments to the Criminal Code that remove barriers for complainants within the sexual assault trial processes. This piece provides an overview of the history of sexual assault provisions in the Criminal Code and the SCC’s decision in J.J..

History of Sexual Assault Criminal Code Provisions

In 1983, the Criminal Code was reformed to narrow the provisions of “rape” and “indecent assault” into three levels of sexual assault.[2] The 1983 reforms also removed exemptions for marital rape and prohibited evidence on the complainant’s sexual history, subject to  limited exceptions.[3] Following the 1983 Criminal Code reforms, the constitutionality of limits on complainant sexual history evidence was challenged in R v Seaboyer.[4] In Seaboyer, the SCC struck down the Criminal Code provisions related to sexual history, finding that they excluded relevant evidence that would interfere with the accused’s right to make a full answer and defence.[5] The SCC held that these provisions were overbroad as they did not minimally impair the accused’s procedural rights.

In response to Seaboyer, Parliament re-introduced Criminal Code provisions that limited complainant sexual history evidence. These reformed sexual history provisions were deemed constitutional by the SCC in R v Darrach[6] and remain in place today under section 276 of the Criminal Code. These section 276 protections, also known as the “rape shield law”, establish that evidence related to the complainant’s sexual history is inadmissible if it supports assumptions that the complainant is: (1) more likely to have consented to the sexual activity at issue during the trial or (2) less worthy of belief.[7] Section 276 creates an exception to the prohibition of evidence related to sexual history, that requires four criteria to be met: (1) the evidence is not being introduced for the above mentioned assumptions (consent and belief), (2) the evidence is relevant to an issue at trial, (3) the evidence is of specific instances of sexual activity, and (4) the evidence has significant probative value that is not “substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice”.[8] Section 276(3) lists numerous considerations that judges must take into account during a sexual history evidence admissibility hearing, including society’s interest in encouraging reports of sexual assault and the potential bias against the complainant’s dignity and privacy.[9]

2018 Legislative Reforms to Sexual Assault Evidence Admissibility

Despite the existing rape shield law protections, barriers remain within the criminal justice system for individuals who experience sexual assault. Only 5% of all sexual assaults are reported to police.[10] There is attrition of sexual assault cases at all levels of the criminal justice system. Data from Statistics Canada found that “an accused was solely identified in three in five (59%) sexual assault incidents reported by police; less than half (43%) of sexual assault incidents resulted in a charge being laid; of these, half (49%) courted; of which just over half (55%) led to a conviction; of which just over half (56%) were sentenced to custody”.[11]

In response to the low levels of sexual assault reporting, Parliament in 2018 enacted further reforms to sexual assault trial procedures. Under sections 278.92 and 278.94 of the Criminal Code, Parliament passed amendments creating new procedures for screening complainant evidence to be introduced in a trial.[12] Prior to these amendments there were no procedures for the admissibility of complainant records held by the accused.[13] However, there were procedures for the admissibility of evidence related to the complainant’s prior sexual history under section 276 of the Criminal Code and there were procedures for the admissibility of complainant records held by third parties under section 278 of the Criminal Code. In relation to the latter, the defence can request access to third party records of the complainant to use as evidence in criminal trials.[14] This evidence includes records from medical and counselling centres, child welfare agencies, residential and public schools, drug and alcohol rehabilitation centres, immigration services, and sexual assault crisis centres.[15] The constitutionality of the third-party records processes under section 278 of the Criminal Code was upheld in R v Mills.[16]

The 2018 Criminal Code reforms sought to address this gap in the sexual assault legislative scheme and create processes governing the admissibility of complainant private records held by the accused. The twin Criminal Code provisions of sections 278.92 and 278.94 create a two-stage process for the introduction of records in sexual assault trials, with a focus on increasing the participation of sexual assault complainants. At the first stage, per section 278.93(2), the accused must submit an application to the judge that “set[s] out detailed particulars of the evidence that the accused seeks to adduce and the relevance of that evidence to an issue at trial”.[17] Subsequently, the judge will review the application considering the threshold tests under sections 278.92(2)(a) and (b) and depending on the type of evidence will also consider the factors laid out in sections 276(3) or 278.92(3) of the Criminal Code. If the judge determines that the application meets the threshold evidence requirements, they will proceed to stage two.[18]

At the second stage, the judge will hold a hearing to determine if the evidence should be admitted under the test set out in section 278.92(2) of the Criminal Code. The section creates differing admissibility tests for section 276 evidence and private records evidence. First, as already discussed, section 276 evidence applications must meet the conditions under section 276(2) and judges must consider the factors laid out in section 276(3).[19] Second, private records applications undergo the admissibility test laid out in section 278.92(2)(b).[20] This provision requires that the evidence meets two conditions: (1) the evidence is relevant to an issue at trial, and (2) the evidence has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.[21] These two conditions must be examined with consideration of the factors listed in section 278.92(3).[22] At the second stage of the evidence admissibility process, the Criminal Code provisions permit the complainant to appear at the hearing and make submissions with assistance of counsel. The complainant’s participation does not extend to the trial and is limited to a victim’s impact statement at sentencing.[23]

The Constitutionality of the Complainant Records Admissibility Processes

Shortly following the passing of the 2018 Criminal Code amendments, their constitutionality was challenged. Two individuals charged with sexual assault (J.J. and Shane Reddick) argued that sections 278.92 and 278.84 of the Criminal Code violated their Charter rights, including the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination under sections 7 and 11(c); their right to a fair trial under sections 7 and 11(d); and their right to make a full answer and defence under sections 7 and 11(d).[24] The SCC majority decision, written by Chief Justice Wagner and Justice Moldaver, held that the 2018 amendments to the Criminal Code were constitutional.

First, at the outset, the SCC dismissed the claim that the evidence admissibility process engages the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination under sections 7 and 11(c) of the Charter.[25] The SCC made this finding on the basis that during the evidence admissibility processes the accused is not compelled to testify.[26]

Second, the SCC rejected that the evidence admissibility provisions infringe the accused’s right to a fair trial under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. To begin, the SCC affirmed that in the context of the right to a fair trial, sections 7 and 11(d) must be assessed together because they are inextricably intertwined.[27] The SCC held that fair trial rights are not infringed because the evidence admissibility procedures reaffirm the fundamental principle of evidence law that only relevant evidence is admitted. The right to a fair trial does not extend to an unlimited right to have all evidence admitted. Instead, the accused’s Charter rights are only infringed when they are not able to admit relevant evidence.[28]

Third, the SCC held that the sexual assault complainant’s participation in the second stage of the evidence admissibility process does not infringe the rights of the accused to make a full answer and defence under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. The SCC determined that the complainant’s participation does not impact the accused’s disclosure rights or undermine prosecutorial independence.[29] Further, the SCC rejected that the accused’s right to make a full answer and defence is undermined by the complainant learning of the evidence to be admitted before the trial. The SCC held that this right does not include having the complainant’s initial emotional reaction to introduced evidence occur during the trial.

Due to the determination that the evidence admissibility procedures for sexual assault do not infringe any Charter rights, the SCC declined to conduct a section 1 analysis to determine if a Charter infringement is demonstrably justified.[30]  

Looking Ahead

The Criminal Code provisions related to sexual assault have undergone extensive reform and litigation over the past forty years. The creation of admissibility procedures for evidence in sexual assault trials and the inclusion of complainant participation options is the most recent legislative reform enacted by Parliament to remove barriers to reporting sexual assault. The SCC in J.J. upheld the constitutionality of the sexual assault evidence admissibility procedures.[31] In doing so, the SCC recognised continued barriers to reporting for individuals who experience sexual assault and held that “more needs to be done”.[32]

Caitlin Salvino is a JD Candidate at the Faculty of Law and is the Asper Centre’s 2022 summer Research Assistant.

 

[1] R v J.J., 2022 SCC 28 [J.J.].

[2] The Criminal Code of Canada classifies sexual assault into three different levels: Level 1: (s. 271 – Sexual Assault) Any form of sexual activity forced on another person (i.e., sexual activity without consent), or non-consensual bodily contact for a sexual purpose (e.g., kissing, touching, oral sex, vaginal or anal intercourse). Level 1 sexual assault involves minor physical injury or no injury to the victim. Conviction for a level 1 sexual assault is punishable by up to 10 years in prison. Level 2: (s. 272 – Sexual Assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm) A sexual assault in which the perpetrator uses or threatens to use a weapon, threatens the victim’s friends or family members, causes bodily harm to the victim, or commits the assault with another person (multiple assailants). Conviction for a level 2 sexual assault is punishable by up to 14 years in prison. Level 3: (s. 273 – Aggravated sexual assault) A sexual assault that wounds, maims, or disfigures the victim, or endangers the victim’s life. Conviction for a level 3 sexual assault is punishable by up to life in prison. See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46, ss 271-273; Martha Shaffer, “The impact of the Charter on the law of sexual assault: plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose” (2012) 57 SCLR 354.

[3] Shaffer, supra note 2 at 337-338.

[4] R v Seaboyer, [1991] 2 SCR 577, 83 DLR (4th) 193.

[5] Ibid at 582-585.

[6] R v Darrach, 2000 SCC 46.

[7] Criminal Code, supra note 2, s 276 (1).

[8] Ibid at s 276 (2).

[9] Ibid at s 276 (3)

[10] Department of Justice Canada, “Sexual Assault – JustFacts”, (31 January 2017), online: https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/jf-pf/2017/may02.html.

[11] Statistics Canada, “From arrest to conviction: Court case outcomes of police-reported sexual assaults in Canada, 2009 to 2014”, (26 October 2017), online: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2017001/article/54870-eng.htm.

[12] An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department of Justice Act and to make consequential amendments to another Act, SC 2018, c 29.

[13] J.J., supra note 1 at para 4.

[14] Criminal Code, supra note 2, s 278.3(2) – 278.3(5)

[15] Karen Busby, “Discriminatory uses of personal records in sexual violence cases” (1996) 9:1 CJWL 148 at 149.

[16] R v Mills, [1999] 3 SCR 668, 180 DLR (4th) 1.

[17] Criminal Code, supra note 2, s 278.93 (2).

[18] J.J., supra note 1 at para 28-29.

[19] Ibid at para 31.

[20] Ibid at para 32.

[21] Criminal Code, supra note 2, s 278.92(2)(b)

[22] The factors to consider include society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences and the potential prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity and right of privacy. For an exhaustive list, see ibid at s 278.92(3).

[23] J.J., supra note 1 at para 33.

[24] Ibid at para 112.

[25] Ibid at paras 148-150.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid at para 114.

[28] Ibid at paras 125 and 129.

[29] Ibid at paras 151 and 176.

[30] Ibid at para 191.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid at para 2.

R v Bissonnette: The Supreme Court’s Ruling on the Constitutionality of Consecutive First Degree Murder Sentences

by Caitlin Salvino

In R v Bissonnette, released on May 27, 2022, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) ruled on the constitutionality of consecutive first degree murder sentences.[1] The SCC held that consecutive first degree murder sentences, authorised under section 745.51 of the Criminal Code (the Code) violates section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) and cannot be “demonstrably justified” in a free and democratic society.

The SCC ruling in Bissonnette garnered headlines across Canada[2] and a strong reaction by some Canadian political leaders[3]. This piece will examine the decision and the reasoning that influenced this unanimous SCC decision.

Legislative History

After the death penalty was abolished in Canada, Parliament created mandatory minimum life sentences for the two categories of first degree and second degree murder. For second degree murder the parole ineligibility period varies between 10 and 15 years. For first degree murder, the parole ineligibility is automatically 25 years, regardless of the number of victims.[4] In 2011, Parliament introduced amendments to the Code under section 745.51 that permitted individuals convicted of multiple counts of murder to have each murder sentence applied consecutively.[5] Thus, a judge may determine that an individual convicted of multiple murders should be sentenced to mandatory periods of ineligibility for parole served consecutively.[6]

Factual Background and Procedural History

On January 29, 2017, the respondent (Alexandre Bissonnette) entered the Great Mosque of Québec with a semi-automatic rifle and opened fire on a crowd of 46 worshippers. Bissonnette killed 6 people and seriously injured 5 others. He pleaded guilty to 12 charges, including 6 counts of first degree murder.[7]

At sentencing the Crown requested that section 745.51 of the Code be applied and the six mandatory periods of ineligibility for parole be served consecutively. If applied consecutively, the sentences would total 150 years before Bissonnette could be eligible for parole. Bissonnette argued that applying section 745.51 of the Code infringes sections 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The Quebec Superior Court held that section 745.51 of the Code violates sections 7 and 12 of the Charter and cannot be “demonstrably justified” under section 1 of the Charter.[8] After declaring the provision unconstitutional, the judge then applied the remedy of reading in and sentenced Bissonnette to 40 years in prison before applying for parole.[9]

The Quebec Court of Appeal (QCCA) unanimously held that section 745.51 of the Code violates sections 7 and 12 of the Charter and cannot be “demonstrably justified” under section 1 of the Charter.[10] The QCCA also held that the trial judge erred in sentencing Bissonnette to 40 years in prison without parole eligibility. The identified error in law was that the sentencing alteration had no basis in law.[11]

Interpreting Section 12 of the Charter: Cruel and Unusual Punishments

In an unanimous decision the SCC ruled that section 745.51 of the Code violates section 12 of the Charter and cannot be saved under section 1. Based on this finding the SCC did not consider if section 7 of the Charter was engaged.[12]

Section 12 of the Charter states that “everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment”.[13] Notably, this right applies to everyone regardless of citizenship status but is limited to humans.[14] Section 12 is engaged only when there is either a punishment or a treatment. In Bissonnette, the SCC determined that the serving of consecutive sentences without the possibility of parole qualified as a punishment to engage section 12.

The SCC then clarified the application of section 12 before applying the principles to the case. Chief Justice Wagner, on behalf of the unanimous Court, affirmed that section 12 has two prongs that must be distinguished.[15] First, section 12 safeguards against a punishment that “is so excessive as to be incompatible with human dignity”.[16] This category is comprised of punishment that not only is excessive but is grossly disproportionate compared to what would have been appropriate.[17] Recent jurisprudence on mandatory minimum sentences have found them to be grossly disproportionate for imposing punishment without consideration of the offenders specific circumstances.[18] Second, section 12 safeguards against punishment that “is intrinsically incompatible with human dignity”.[19] This narrower category comprised of punishments that are by nature incompatible with human dignity will always be considered grossly disproportionate.[20] Other punishments recognised in this evolving category include corporal punishment, lobotomisation of certain dangerous offenders and castration of sexual offenders.[21]

The SCC held that a punishment will be held to infringe section 12 if either of these two prongs is engaged. While pursuing a section 12 analysis, the SCC determined that courts must first analyse the nature of the punishment before considering gross disproportionality.[22]

Application to Bissonnette Factual Matrix

After considering the facts the SCC held that the application of consecutive first degree murder sentences without the possibility of parole was grossly disproportionate because they “are degrading in nature and thus incompatible with human dignity”. This determination was made based on the finding that such consecutive sentences deny offenders any possibility of reform and societal reintegration.[23] Based on the lower life expectancy of individuals in prison, the SCC held that any consecutive sentence of 50 years or more without parole was akin to a life sentence without parole.[24] The SCC also drew on comparative[25] and international law[26] to guide their interpretation of the Charter rights.

The SCC concluded their section 12 analysis by determining that the discretionary nature of sentences and the royal prerogative authority does not permit imposing a punishment contrary to section 12 of the Charter.

After finding that consecutive first degree murder sentences without parole eligibility infringes section 12, the SCC briefly analysed whether section 745.51 of the Code could be saved under section 1. Section 1 of the Charter, also known as the reasonable limits clause, allows the government to reasonably limit a Charter right if the limitation “can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.[27] The SCC drew on its earlier decision in R v Nur to find that “it is hard to imagine how a punishment that is cruel and unusual by nature could be justified in a free and democratic society”.[28]

At the remedy stage, the SCC held that the trial court erred in its interpretation of its authority under the remedy of reading in.[29] Instead, the SCC applied section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to declare section 745.51 of the Code invalid for a breach of section 12 of the Charter that could not be saved under section 1.[30] The declaration of invalidity would come into effect immediately.[31]

Looking Ahead

Bissonnette is the second unanimous SCC decision rendered on Charter rights within criminal law proceedings in May 2022. In R v Sullivan, the SCC held that the barring of the defence of self-induced intoxication for crimes of general intent under section 33 of the Code unjustifiably infringed sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.[32] These two unanimous decisions establish clear safeguards for the constitutional rights of individuals accused of an offence or undergoing sentencing.

Immediately following the release of the Bissonnette decision, two federal Conservative Party of Canada leadership candidates expressed their intent to invoke the notwithstanding clause to temporarily set aside the effects of the decision.[33] The notwithstanding clause entrenched under section 33 of the Charter, is a legislative tool that permits a federal, provincial, or territorial legislature to declare an Act or provision of an Act to operate notwithstanding sections 2 and 7 to 15 of the Charter. Any notwithstanding clause declaration must be passed by a legislative simple majority and expires after five years.[34] If the notwithstanding clause were to be invoked to temporarily suspend section 12 of the Charter, it would be the first time ever used by the federal Parliament.[35]

Caitlin Salvino is a JD Candidate at the Faculty of Law and is the Asper Centre’s 2022 summer Research Assistant.

[1] R v Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23 [Bissonnette].

[2] Isabelle Porter, “Alexandre Bissonnette pourra chercher une libération conditionnelle après 25 ans”, Le Devoir (28 May 2022), online: <https://www.ledevoir.com/societe/justice/716079/decision-cour-supreme-alexandre-bissonnette-mosquee-de-quebec>; Joe Lofaro, “Supreme Court rules Quebec City mosque killer to be eligible for parole in 25 years”, CTV Montreal (27 May 2022), online: <https://montreal.ctvnews.ca/supreme-court-rules-quebec-city-mosque-killer-to-be-eligible-for-parole-in-25-years-1.5921148>; Antoni Nerestant, “Quebec City mosque shooter must get chance at parole after 25 years, Supreme Court rules”, CBC News Montreal (27 May 2022), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/supreme-court-canada-bissonnette-mosque-shooting-sentence-parole-1.6466847>; Sean Fine, “Supreme Court to rule on constitutionality of life without parole in case of Quebec City mosque shooter”, The Globe and Mail (25 May 2022), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-supreme-court-quebec-city-mosque-shooter/>.

[3] Federal Conservative Party of Canada leadership candidates Pierre Poilievre and Patrick Brown both released statements following the SCC ruling pledging to invoke the notwithstanding clause to temporarily suspend the decision if elected. The notwithstanding clause under section 33 of the Charter, permits a federal, provincial or territorial legislature to suspend sections 2 and 7 to 15 of the Charter for a renewable period of 5 years. See Peter Zimonjic, “Government disagrees with top court’s decision on gunman’s parole but will respect it: Lametti”, CBC News (27 May 2022), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/lametti-top-court-parole-decision-1.6468914>; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 8, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), c 11 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), 1982, s 33.

[4] Bissonnette, supra note 1 at para 31.

[5] Ibid at para 34.

[6] Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 745.51.

[7] Bissonnette, supra note 1 at paras 11–12.

[8] R c Bissonnette, 2019 QCCS 354.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Bissonnette c R, 2020 QCCA 1585.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Bissonnette, supra note 1 at para 119.

[13] Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 3, s 12.

[14] Quebec (Attorney General) v 9147-0732 Québec inc., 2020 SCC 32.

[15] Bissonnette, supra note 1 at para 59.

[16] Ibid at para 60.

[17] Ibid at para 61.

[18] Ibid at para 63 citing R v Nur, 2015 SCC 15; R v Ferguson, 2008 SCC 96; R v Lloyd, 2016 SCC 13.

[19] Bissonnette, supra note 1 at para 60.

[20] Ibid at para 64.

[21] Ibid at paras 64–65.

[22] Ibid at para 69.

[23] Ibid at para 73.

[24] Ibid at para 78.

[25] Ibid at paras 105–106.

[26] The SCC referenced the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Rome Statute, and the European Convention on Human Rights. See ibid at paras 99–104.

[27] Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 3, s 1.

[28] Bissonnette, supra note 1 at para 121.

[29] Ibid at para 124.

[30] Ibid at para 123.

[31] Ibid at para 125.

[32] R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19. For an analysis of Sullivan, see Kathryn Mullins. ”R v Sullivan, R v Chan and R v Brown: The Supreme Court’s Ruling on the Defence of Extreme Intoxication”. David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights, May 2022. online: https://aspercentre.ca/r-v-sullivan-r-v-chan-and-r-v-brown-the-supreme-courts-ruling-on-the-defence-of-extreme-intoxication/.

[33] Zimonjic, supra note 3.

[34] Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 3, s 33.

[35] Caitlin Salvino, “A Tool of Last Resort: A Comprehensive Account of the Notwithstanding Clause Political Uses 1982-2021” (2022) 16:1 JPPL.

Asper Centre granted intervener status in 2 upcoming Ontario Court of Appeal cases and seeks standing in a third one

City of Toronto v. Attorney General of Ontario et al

On September 10, 2018, Ontario Superior Court Judge Edward Belobaba in City of Toronto et al v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2018 ONSC 5151 declared that the province of Ontario had “substantially interfered” with the Charter section 2(b) freedom of expression rights of both the municipal ward election candidates and City of Toronto voters and struck down the province’s Bill 5 (which reduced the number of City of Toronto wards from 47 to 25) as unconstitutional.

The province appealed the decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal, which on September 19, 2018 stayed the order of the Superior Court pending the appeal, and thus allowed the election to proceed with the reduced number of wards.

The appeal of the lower court decision will be heard on June 10-11, 2019. The Asper Centre has been granted intervener status in this appeal, with its arguments focusing on the role that section 2(b) of the Charter plays “in ensuring a stable and protected election framework which is necessary to foster full engagement in the democratic process.”  Read the Asper Centre’s Intervener Factum here.

R v. Sharma

Ms. Sharma is a bi-racial Indigenous woman, whose ex-boyfriend used her as a drug mule and she was charged and convicted with importing just under 2kgs of cocaine. She would have been a suitable candidate for a conditional sentence but for the prohibition preventing drug importers from receiving a conditional sentence.

Based on a s.12 Charter argument advanced by Ms. Sharma that 2 years in jail would be grossly disproportionate and thus cruel and unusual punishment, the judge in R. v. Sharma, 2018 ONSC 1141, found that the mandatory minimum sentence of 2 years under the Act was unconstitutional and unjustified under section 1 of the Charter.  This aspect of the decision was not appealed.

Ms. Sharma also advanced a s.15 Charter argument that s.742.1(b) and (c) of the Criminal Code disproportionately affects Indigenous women as it removes the ability to serve their sentences as conditional sentences. The judge did not address (b) since he had already found the mandatory minimum to be unconstitutional. As for (c), the judge held that there is no reason to believe that the prohibition on conditional sentences, on the record before it, created an adverse effect such that it can qualify as a distinction based on Aboriginal status. This claim was dismissed.

Ultimately, the judge determined 18 months incarceration to be just, and reduced it by only 1 month given Gladue factors.

Ms. Sharma appealed her sentence to the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Asper Centre jointly with LEAF (the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund) were granted intervener status in this appeal.

R v. Morris

Mr. Morris is a black male who was charged with multiple offences including possession of illegal firearms and assaulting a police officer. He was convicted only of the firearms offences.

Upon sentencing, the judge considered Mr. Morris’ personal social context, based on reports from psychologists and social scientists with an expertise on black racism in Canada. The Crown sought 4-4.5 years while the defence sought 1 (before Charter breaches were accounted for). In his decision the judge mentions that reports, such as the ones he was presented with, are not new to the law given Gladue reports for Indigenous offenders. He ultimately, in light of  Mr. Morris’s upbringing and social context (among the other mitigating and aggravating factors), sentenced him to 15 months, reduced to 12 months for Charter breaches.

The Crown appealed the sentence stating that the sentencing judge erred by imposing an unfit sentence, erred in his treatment of social context evidence and erred in his treatment of aggravating/mitigating factors.

The Asper Centre has applied for intervener status in this case. The motion is scheduled to be heard on June 13th.

Asper Centre Director Cheryl Milne to moderate a panel discussion in upcoming University of Toronto Faculty of Law Symposium: Reforming Criminal Justice and National Security

Hosted by U of T Faculty of Law and Supported by the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation.  Co-sponsored by the Criminal Law Quarterly and the Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy Group, Global Justice Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs

Tuesday May 30, 2017
University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 84 Queens Park, Solarium
10 am-5pm with reception to follow

This symposium is designed to produce a special double issue of the Criminal Law Quarterly that will reflect on the processes and challenges of reforming criminal justice and national security.

The aim is to examine specific contexts of pressing concerns that may be the subject of anticipated legislation including expected amendments to Ontario’s Police Services Act, expected amendments to the Criminal Code and expected amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015 and related national security legislation.

The symposium is designed to bring academics, policy-makers and practitioners together for frank and open discussion of matters of common concern and pressing importance.

The symposium will end with a panel on general reflections about the process of criminal justice and national security reform.

The Symposium is free but registration is required. To register click on the registration form below.

See the Symposium agenda (PDF)

Registration form

For more information, contact michelle.rosenstock@utoronto.ca