Asper Centre Intervenes in Climate Change Case at ONCA

by Chelsea Gordon, Daniel Kiesman and Sang Park

On January 15, 2024, the Asper Centre intervened before the Ontario Court of Appeal in Mathur v Ontario. The Asper Centre’s Constitutional Litigator in Residence Ewa Krajewska acted as counsel for the Asper Centre in this intervention. As students in the Asper Centre Clinic course this past term, we had the opportunity to contribute to the intervention by conducting research and drafting versions of the factum as part of our clinic coursework.

Mathur is a significant case because it is the first time that substantive legal issues of a constitutional challenge to insufficient government action to address climate change has been before an appellate court in Canada. Furthermore, this case is also one of the first s. 15(1) Charter cases to reach an appellate court since the Supreme Court modified its approach to s. 15(1) in R v Sharma.[1]

Background

The appellants are a group of seven young Ontarians. The appellants challenge a 2018 decision by the Government of Ontario to lower the province’s greenhouse gas emissions target to 30% below 2005 levels by 2030. Ontario set this target despite scientific research showing that to prevent serious adverse consequences in relation to health, food security, and human security, greenhouse gas emissions would need to be reduced by 52% below 2005 levels by 2030. As a result, the appellants argue that this emissions target violates s. 7 of the Charter by allowing a level of emissions that will lead to serious adverse consequences and put the lives of Ontarians at risk. The appellants also argue that the emissions target violates s. 15(1) of the Charter because young people and future generations will disproportionately bear the burdens and face the adverse effects of inadequate climate change policy.

The Superior Court of Ontario held that the appellants’ challenge was justiciable but dismissed the appellants’ Charter claims.[2] The Asper Centre also intervened at the Superior Court, read the factum here.

With regard to s. 7 the application judge appeared open to the idea that climate change could be the kind of issue area where a positive s. 7 obligation on government could arise and assumed without deciding that a positive obligation arose here.[3] However, the application judge held that the emissions target did not infringe any principles of fundamental justice and therefore did not infringe s. 7.[4] Regarding s. 15(1) the application judge, applying Sharma, held that the claim must fail at the first step of the test as causation cannot be established. The application judge held that causation could not be established because the “disproportionate impact is caused by climate change and not the [emissions] target.”[5]

The Asper Centre’s Intervention at the Court of Appeal

The Asper Centre’s intervention at the Court of Appeal is focused on two issues. First, that the application judge erred by adopting a formalistic approach to causation that has consistently been rejected by the s. 15(1) jurisprudence. Second, given the complexities and the novelty of climate change, should the Court of Appeal find a Charter infringement it ought to go beyond declaratory relief to craft an appropriate and just remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

Read the Asper Centre’s factum here.

In its submissions relating to causation in the s. 15(1) analysis, the Asper Centre traces the history of equality jurisprudence to underscore that substantive equality drives the s. 15(1) analysis and that the application judge erred by abandoning a substantive approach and adopting a formalistic analysis of causation. The Asper Centre notes that from the start, in the first s. 15(1) case Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, the Supreme Court recognized that a seemingly neutral law may create an unequal impact on a particular group and as a result the s. 15(1) analysis must focus on the impact of the law on a particular group.[6] This approach has been repeatedly affirmed in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Most recently the importance of substantive equality was reaffirmed in Sharma where the Supreme Court stated it is an “animating norm” of s. 15(1).

Furthermore, the intervention seeks to emphasize that the proper approach to causation must be flexible and contextual. Such an approach does not require that an impugned law be the only cause of an adverse impact. Rather, to establish causation a claimant need only show that a law is a cause. To support this approach the Asper Centre highlights cases such as Fraser v Canada (Attorney General) where an RCMP job-sharing program, which was not in and of itself the root cause of wage inequality, was found to infringe s. 15(1) because it furthered the economic disadvantages women face in society.[7]

Despite these precedents, the application judge adopted a formal and rigid approach to causation, holding that the emissions target did not infringe s. 15(1) because the harms to youth are caused by climate change. This approach harkens back to the rejected approach to equality taken under the Canadian Bill of Rights wherein a provision which restricted access to employment insurance to pregnant women was allowed to stand because the discriminatory impact on pregnant women was not caused by the legislation, but by the fact that the women were pregnant. This approach also departs from the decades of precedent which instruct a flexible and contextual approach that centres substantive equality at the heart of s. 15(1).

Should the Court of Appeal find a Charter infringement the Asper Centre’s submission encourages the Court to be creative and utilize its remedial discretion under s. 24(1) of the Charter to forge an appropriate and just remedy. Declaratory relief will be insufficient in this case as the impacts of climate change, stemming from government inaction present complex and novel issues for the legal system. Faced with novel issues the Supreme Court, in cases such as Ontario v G[8] and Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education),[9] has crafted unique remedies under s. 24(1). Furthermore, as the Asper Centre notes in its factum, courts in other jurisdictions, such as the German Constitutional Court[10] and the Supreme Court of the Netherlands,[11] which have confronted the issue of inadequate government climate policies have crafted creative remedies aimed at addressing the complexities of climate change.

Chelsea Gordon, Daniel Kiesman and Sang Park are JD Candidates at the Faculty of Law and were Asper Centre clinic students in Fall 2023.

[1] R v Sharma, 2022 SCC 39.

[2] Mathur v Ontario, 2023 ONSC 2316

[3] Mathur v Ontario, 2023 ONSC 2316 at para 82.

[4] Mathur v Ontario, 2023 ONSC 2316 at para 142.

[5] Mathur v Ontario, 2023 ONSC 2316 at para 178.

[6] Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at 164.

[7] Fraser v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28 at paras 92-107, 113.

[8] Ontario (Attorney General) v G, 2020 SCC 38.

[9] Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62.

[10] 1 BvR 2656/18 (2021).

[11] C-565/19 P, C/09/456689 / HA ZA 13-1396.

Moving Towards Substantive Equality in Sentencing: R v Morris

by: Bailey Fox

Introduction

In R v Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, the Ontario Court of Appeal (OCA) considered the impact and role of anti-Black racism in sentencing. The Asper Centre intervened in the appeal, specifically on the issue of whether an offender is required to prove a causal link between systemic racism and the offence. The Court’s decision is both ground-breaking, in recognizing the impact of systemic racism in sentencing, but aspects of the decision also limit the impact it may have in realizing substantive equality.

Mr. Morris was found guilty of gun-related offences, including possession of a loaded handgun. The sentencing judge, having accepted pre-trial sentencing reports detailing the impact of anti-black racism on Mr. Morris’ life and actions, sentenced him to a mitigated 15-month sentence. The Crown appealed the sentence, arguing that it is unfit and not commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown and increased Mr. Morris’ sentence to two years but stayed the sentence. In lengthy reasons, the Court clarified the role of anti-Black racism in assessing the offender’s blameworthiness, how to prove the impact of systemic racism, and the interaction between the fact of racism and sentencing principles.

Taking Steps…

Aspects of the decision are important for defence lawyers hoping to advance substantive equality in the criminal law. Specifically, the Ontario Court of Appeal acknowledged the existence and negative effects of anti-Black racism in society and in the criminal justice system. The Court held that anti-Black racism should be considered in the sentencing process, specifically in assessing the offender’s moral blameworthiness. Importantly from an access to justice perspective, the OCA held that judges may take judicial notice of anti-Black racism and Black individuals should not be required to tender expert reports detailing the existence of anti-Black racism and its impact on them.

The Court also held that an offender need not demonstrate a causal link between systemic racism and the relevant offence, a holding in line with the Asper Centre’s submissions and the objectives of substantive equality. As an intervenor, the Asper Centre submitted that an offender should not be required to prove a causal link between systemic anti-black racism and the offending conduct. The Asper Centre highlighted that proving such a causal link is not required in other circumstances, such as in the case of youthful offenders or offenders with mental illness. The Asper Centre also submitted that the requirement to prove a causal link is not compatible with the objectives of substantive equality. While an offender may show evidence of how systemic factors affected them, a requirement to demonstrate a causal link would place an undue evidentiary burden on offenders. In holding that a causal link is not required, the Ontario Court of Appeal’s reasons largely mirror the Asper Centre’s submissions on this point. The Court held that while there must be some connection between systemic racism and the criminal conduct, causation “plays no role when considering the impact of an offender’s background or circumstances on sentencing” (para 96 – 97) The court concluded that social context evidence can be useful in explaining the offence and mitigating the offender’s moral culpability (para 99).

…Cautiously…

However, the Court also limited the utility and scope of recognizing anti-Black racism in sentencing. First, the Court held that sentencing judges may only take the role of anti-Black racism into account when considering the offender’s moral culpability but not in considering the seriousness of the offence (para 75). According to sentencing principles, the more serious the offence – and gun-related offences are generally considered more serious – the more a sentence should emphasize the principles of denunciation and deterrence. The OCA held that anti-Black racism cannot reduce an evaluation of the seriousness of the offence and therefore deterrence and denunciation remain important objectives when sentencing Black individuals. This holding however, maintains a cognitive dissonance between society’s collective responsibility for systemic racism and the individual’s conduct – that anti-Black racism does not affect the principle of denunciation impedes both recognizing the impact of racism and addressing it. In concluding that the sentencing judge erred in taking anti-Black racism into account in the context of assessing the seriousness of the offence, the Court of Appeal signals that systemic racism can affect sentencing, but only to a point.

While the case did not explicitly invoke the Charter’s s.15 equality guarantee, the Court’s analysis is very thin on the interaction between s.15, and the goal of substantive equality, and sentencing. Specifically, while recognizing that an offender need not demonstrate a causal connection between the offence and racism, the Court held that a judge may take systemic racism into account and not that they must. Unlike the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s decision in R v Anderson, 2021 NSCA 62, the Court did not go so far as to say that it is an error of law if a sentencing judge fails to consider the impact of systemic anti-Black racism. This is unfortunate because under R v Morris, it remains the defence lawyer’s responsibility to raise the issue, and it is within the sentencing judge’s discretion as to how to apply such considerations. This could lead to uneven application of the Court’s findings in R v Morris.

While recognizing the fact of systemic anti-Black racism, the Court’s decision also clings to some conventional individual responsibility and tough on crime narratives in sentencing, therefore limiting the impact of the decision. Notably, the Court overturned the sentencing judge’s finding of fact on why Mr. Morris fled from the police. The sentencing judge had found that Mr. Morris fled at least in part because of an ‘impulsive reaction’ based on his fear of the police and that he would not be treated fairly. However, the OCA held that the ‘only reasonable inference’ is that Mr. Morris fled to avoid being caught (para 171). The Court does not explain why this is the only reasonable inference, or why it was an error to consider the systemic racism often reflected in policing of Black communities in this finding of fact. Similarly, the Court noted that members of the community would not consider “more lenient” sentences for gun crimes as advancing social equality (para 85). This finding, first, reflects and embeds an understanding of conditional sentences as lenient, as opposed to commensurate with the offender’s circumstances. Second, it assigns a ‘tough on crime’ perspective to the community without considering the impact of incarceration on community well-being. In embedding these perspectives in a decision while also recognizing that anti-Black systemic racism may be considered in sentencing, the Court limits the reach of the latter finding.

Conclusion

R v Morris is a promising step in the direction of promoting substantive equality in sentencing. The Court recognized that judges may take judicial notice of anti-Black racism and that offenders need not prove a causal link, holdings that will promote consideration of racism in sentencing. However, in limiting the role of systemic racism in the sentencing process while clinging to a tough on crime perspective, the Court limited the impact of its finding therefore inhibiting the potential for achieving substantive equality in the sentencing process.

Bailey Fox is a Research Assistant with the Asper Centre and is currently an LLM student at the University of Toronto, Faculty of Law.

How should judges consider anti-Black racism in sentencing? Asper Centre intervenes in R v Morris

by Teodora Pasca

On February 11, 2021, the Court of Appeal for Ontario heard oral arguments in R v Morris, the long-anticipated appeal that is expected to determine how systemic anti-Black racism should factor into sentencing determinations.

The Asper Centre intervened in R v Morris with the assistance of counsel Nader Hasan of Stockwoods LLP and Geetha Philipupillai of Goldblatt Partners LLP. The Asper Centre argued that the principle of substantive equality — which requires courts to actively consider the potentially discriminatory impact of criminal laws and procedures on marginalized people — must play a central role in developing a framework for sentencing Black offenders.

The Respondent, Kevin Morris, was a young Black man living in Toronto who had experienced substantial disadvantage and discrimination prior to coming before the court. Having lost his father to cancer at the age of 7, Mr. Morris was raised by a single mother. Though she worked multiple jobs to make ends meet, the family experienced significant financial disadvantage that limited his opportunities. Mr. Morris has lived with a learning disability and mental illness throughout much of his life. Living in inner-city public housing, he repeatedly witnessed violence and was himself a victim of violence, within an environment where his community distrusted the police’s ability to protect them from harm.

Experiences like these made life very challenging for Mr. Morris, and ultimately culminated in criminal proceedings. At the age of 22, he was charged and convicted of possessing an illegal firearm.

The principle of substantive equality is key to understanding the life experiences that brought Mr. Morris before the court and contributed to his offence. As counsel for Mr. Morris Faisal Mirza and Gail Smith argued, the substantial documentation introduced at the sentencing hearing demonstrated that Mr. Morris’s experiences — including poverty, difficulties in school, mental health issues, and violent victimization — were manifestations of anti-Black racism. This is because Black communities experience systemic discrimination and barriers to access in all of these areas of life.

Black people are also more likely to experience discrimination within the criminal justice system and be victimized by police use of force. When Mr. Morris was arrested, for example, police breached his right to counsel under s 10(b) of the Charter and ran over his foot with their squad car.

All parties before the Court of Appeal agreed that systemic anti-Black racism is directly relevant to an offender’s moral blameworthiness and is properly considered in sentencing. The primary dispute was how such factors ought to be considered, as well as whether the specific sentence Mr. Morris received was fit.

Acknowledging the impact of anti-Black racism on the circumstances that brought Mr. Morris before the court, Nakatsuru J sentenced him to a mitigated yet still substantial term of 15 months’ imprisonment, reduced to 12 months to account for the Charter breaches. On appeal, the Crown argued that 15 months was a manifestly unfit sentence in light of the seriousness of the offence and the need for denunciation and deterrence. Conversely, Mr. Morris’s counsel argued that there were no errors in Nakatsuru J’s sentencing determination and that the ultimate sentence imposed — which still put Mr. Morris in jail for a year — sufficiently addressed public safety concerns while being appropriately sensitive to the lived experiences that reduced Mr. Morris’s moral blameworthiness.

The Asper Centre did not take a position on Mr. Morris’s sentence. Its submissions on appeal instead focused on the broader question of how systemic and background factors should inform the sentencing framework for Black offenders.

Drawing on guidance provided by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Gladue, the Asper Centre argued that a similar framework — which incorporates systemic and background factors into sentencing and prioritizes non-custodial options — should be adopted for Black offenders. In the Asper Centre’s view, promoting substantive equality in sentencing requires implementing a “Gladue­-like framework” for Black offenders. Although their historical circumstances differ, Black people in Canada experience many of the same circumstances that called for a new approach in the Indigenous context in Gladue, including persistent experiences of discrimination when dealing with the criminal justice system and pronounced over-representation in the prison population.

In its factum, the Asper Centre also took issue with the Crown’s position that something akin to a “causal link” to the offence and the offender is required in order to consider factors linked to anti-Black racism in sentencing. (The Crown ultimately stepped back from this position in oral argument.)

Ultimately, the Asper Centre proposed that a new sentencing framework for Black offenders, in order to be consistent with the principle of substantive equality, should include the following four features:

  • Judges should always turn their minds to systemic factors, even in cases that typically prioritize deterrence and denunciation.
  • The offender should not have an evidentiary onus to show a causal link between their offence and the systemic factors they raise.
  • Judges should request a particularized pre-sentence report that speaks to systemic and background factors if they believe such information will assist in their decision-making.
  • Judges should apply all the purposes and principles of sentencing in light of the reality of anti-Black racism, with maximum attention paid to restorative justice and the principle of restraint.

Morris provides the Court of Appeal with a valuable opportunity to address and clarify how anti-Black racism can be considered in sentencing Black offenders. It remains to be seen what framework or approach the Court will adopt, but its ultimate decision is one to watch — this case could shape how sentencing judges approach issues of racial discrimination and equality for years to come.

The Asper Centre’s intervener factum in R v Morris can be found at this link.

Teodora Pasca is a 3L JD/MA Criminology Student at the Faculty of Law.

Ontario Court of Appeal Rules G20 Protester’s Rights Violated by Police

 

Ten years after Toronto hosted the G20 summit, a civil suit launched against the Toronto police has finally been resolved by the Ontario Court of Appeal. The decision—Stewart v. Toronto (Police Services Board)—represents a strong affirmation of the constitutional right to protest, especially in public spaces like parks.

The case arose out of the G20 summit held in Toronto in 2010. A group of activists had organized a public rally in Allan Gardens, a public park in downtown Toronto. Based on vague reports of potential violence by “Black Bloc” protesters, the police set up an indiscriminate perimeter around the park the day before the rally and required all those wishing to participate in the protest to submit to a search of their personal belongings. The police also seized items that they believed could be used to defeat the effects of tear gas and pepper spray, such as goggles, bandanas, and vinegar.

The police stopped the appellant, Luke Stewart, and told him they were searching all protesters under the authority of the Trespass to Property Act. Mr. Stewart refused to consent to the search, believing it to be unconstitutional. When he attempted to move past the police perimeter, he was forcibly detained. The police then searched his bag and confiscated a pair of swimming goggles.

Mr. Stewart brought a lawsuit against the police in 2011, seeking Charter damages for violation of his freedom of expression, right not to be arbitrarily detained, and right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure. The Superior Court dismissed his claim in 2018, ruling that the police had the requisite search powers and did not infringe any of his constitutional rights.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) intervened in this case at both the trial level and at the appeal, arguing for limits on the power of police to interfere with the rights of protesters.

Winston Gee headshot

Winston Gee

Winston Gee, an associate at Torys LLP and former Asper Centre Clinic student, presented the CCLA’s submissions at the hearing of the appeal.

In reasons written by Justice Brown, the Court of Appeal agreed with the CCLA that the police had no legal authority for their actions. It overturned each of the trial judge’s rulings and awarded Mr. Stewart $500 in Charter damages. The Court also affirmed the fundamental importance of free political expression, especially in public parks:

“Our civil liberties tradition recognizes that public parks, such as Allan Gardens, are civic spaces naturally compatible with the public expression of views, whether the content of those views support or dissent from the popular sentiments of the day… The freedom to engage in the peaceful public expression of political views is central to our conception of a free and democratic society. Freedom of expression requires zealous protection.”

Despite the low damages award, Gee was pleased that “the Court accepted one of our central submissions at the hearing—that the Trespass to Property Act does not create any substantive property rights but is merely a mechanism to enforce existing rights that come from other sources, such as the common law.” As a result, the Act could not be used by the police to impose “conditions of entry” of their choosing. That power properly belonged to the City as the common law owner and occupier of the park—and it is subject always to the Charter.

Gee said that his work on this case “benefitted immensely from my time at the Asper Centre. That’s where I first gained experience with appellate advocacy, including by learning from leading constitutional litigators like Mary Eberts and Marlys Edwardh. I also had the opportunity to assist with the Asper Centre’s intervention in Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General), one of the Supreme Court’s leading cases on Charter damages. That experience was particularly relevant to this case.”

Gee also thanked his colleagues at Torys for providing excellent mentorship and for giving him the opportunity to argue such an important case.

by T. Schreier, with Winston Gee (JD/MPP UTLaw 2017)

Substantive equality in sentencing: Interventions in R v Morris and R v Sharma

By Teodora Pasca

This fall, the Asper Centre is intervening in two cases before the Ontario Court of Appeal (ONCA) whose outcomes could significantly impact the province’s approach to sentencing marginalized people.

In R v Morris, the ONCA will consider the appropriate manner in which systemic factors should shape the sentencing framework for Black Canadians. Morris was convicted of possession of illegal firearms and received a sentence of 12 months, reduced from 15 months for Charter breaches. Among other factors, the sentencing judge was mindful of the social context in which Morris committed the offence with reference to reports from psychologists and social scientists with expertise on Black racism in Canada.

In R v Sharma, the Asper Centre and the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) are jointly intervening on a constitutional challenge to ss. 742.1(c) and (e)(ii) of the Criminal Code, which eliminate conditional sentences for certain offences. Sharma is an Indigenous biracial woman convicted of a drug importation offence who, but for these provisions, would have been a suitable candidate for a conditional sentence.

Despite the Supreme Court’s aspirations in Gladue, Indigenous people in Canada continue to be criminalized and incarcerated at alarming rates. In particular, the overrepresentation of Indigenous women in prisons has increased substantially over the past 10 years. The criminal justice system in Canada is designed in a manner incompatible with Indigenous laws and conceptions of justice, which can be deeply alienating.

Though their historical circumstances are different, Black Canadians also experience significant systemic discrimination and bias when dealing with police, in the courts, and in corrections. Nationally, the rate of incarceration for Black Canadians is three times greater than their representation in the overall population, and the overrepresentation is even more pronounced for Black women.

Morris and Sharma illustrate how the overarching principle of substantive equality can illuminate sentencing decisions in cases involving marginalized people. Substantive equality is a constitutional imperative that requires courts to analyze the potentially discriminatory impact of laws with regard to their social, political, and legal context. Substantive equality plays a vital role in the criminal justice system, including at the sentencing stage. These cases suggest that sentencing judges should be mindful of systemic discrimination at all stages of the process and the ways in which that discrimination might have impacted the individual or their circumstances.

Since the Gladue decision came down in 1999, courts have been constitutionally mandated to consider the role that historical disadvantage, discrimination, and alienation play in cases involving Indigenous offenders. More broadly, the principle of restraint in s 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code requires courts to consider all sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances; though it is particularly vital for Indigenous people, this provision applies to all offenders in all cases.

It is settled that systemic factors such as historical disadvantage can be considered in sentencing cases involving Black Canadians. The question is how. The Crown’s position in Morris is that contextual factors should be considered only if the offender can establish a causal link between those factors and the offence. The Supreme Court in R v Ipeelee previously rejected the “causal link” requirement in the context of Indigenous sentencing. The Asper Centre argues it is unfair to ask marginalized people to demonstrate their life circumstances “caused” their crime — a burden even experts struggle to meet — and has put forward more robust guidelines for considering these factors that is informed by substantive equality principles.

In Sharma, conversely, the ONCA will consider whether eliminating conditional sentences for certain offences is incompatible with the Gladue framework. The potentially discriminatory effect of ss 742.1(c) and (e)(ii) is to deprive Indigenous people of a reasonable alternative to jail, despite the firm conclusions in Gladue and Ipeelee that alternatives to imprisonment must be prioritized. Asper and LEAF argue that the constitutionality of the provisions must be assessed in light of systemic discrimination against Indigenous people — especially Indigenous women, who are alarmingly over-represented both as offenders and as victims. Alternatives to incarceration are particularly essential when the system criminalizes acts that Indigenous women often turn to for survival, due to factors such as high levels of poverty, food insecurity, and overcrowded housing, as well as extremely high rates of physical and sexual abuse.

Collectively, Morris and Sharma acknowledge that consideration of historical and social context can be invaluable to the sentencing process for marginalized people. Requiring sentencing judges to at least turn their mind to these factors allows them to make a more informed decision about what is best for the individual and for society looking forward. While imposing a “fit” sentence is already the goal of sentencing, requiring that substantive equality shapes the analysis can make that goal a reality.

The Asper Centre’s intervener facta can be found at this linkSharma will be argued on November 20 and Morris will be argued TBD.

Teodora Pasca is a 2L JD Student at the Faculty of Law