Asper Centre hosts panel on Indigenous Child Welfare and Self-Governance

by Taoran Li

On 31 October 2024, the Asper Centre’s Indigenous Rights Working Group presented a panel event to unpack the significant legal issues and potential future implications of two recent decisions on Indigenous child welfare and self-governance. The decisions Haaland v Brackeen, 599 U.S 255 (2023) issued by the Supreme Court of the United States and Reference re An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, 2024 SCC 5  issued by the Supreme Court of Canada, determined the validity of federal legislation introduced to address historic and ongoing harms caused by the apprehension of Indigenous children from their families by settler governments in both Canada and the United States.

The panel, moderated by Cheryl Milne, the Executive Director of the Asper Centre, consisted of Maggie Blackhawk, professor at New York University and teacher of federal Indian law, constitutional law and legislation; Sara Mainville, partner at JFK Law LLP and Chief of Couchiching First Nation; and, Professor John Borrows, the Loveland Chair in Indigenous Law at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law.

The idea for the panel and the questions formed for the panelists were the result of research conducted by the Asper Centre’s Indigenous Rights Working Group in 2023. Isabel Klassen-Marshall, one of the co-leaders for the Working Group began the discussion by introducing the facts and issues in the two cases. In Reference re An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, 2024 SCC 5 the Canadian Supreme Court considered the validity of “An Act Respecting First Nations, Inuit and Metis Children, Youth and Families” or Bill C-92, an Act passed by Parliament in 2019. The Act formally recognized the inherent Aboriginal right of self-government, including jurisdiction over child and family services and established mechanisms through which Indigenous communities can exercise their authority, either by enacting their own laws or through coordination agreements negotiated with federal and provincial governments.

In response to a reference question triggered by the Attorney-General of Quebec, the Quebec Court of Appeal held the provisions in the Act to be valid, except for the provisions which gave Indigenous laws the force of federal law. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Act as a whole as constitutionally valid. The Supreme Court’s approach differed from the Quebec Court by recognizing constitutionality through a federalism analysis, rather than a finding of a generic s 35 right to self-government over child and family services. The Court held that the Parliament’s explicit affirmation of an inherent right to self-government was an expression of Parliament’s position on the scope of s 35, rather than any amendment of the Constitution or actual recognition of a s 35 right.

Haaland v Brackeen related to a constitutional challenge to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), brought by the State of Texas, three families who wished to adopt or foster Indigenous children and an Indigenous woman who wanted non-Indigenous parents to adopt her biological child. The ICWA is a federal law enacted in 1978 providing for minimum standards for foster care and adoption cases involving Indigenous children. It overrides aspects of state family law to preserve the stability of tribal nations and communities, including a placement preference in adoption cases for relatives, members of the child’s tribe, and members of other Indigenous families. The claimants’ challenge comprised many grounds, including that Congress lacked the authority to enact ICWA and that ICWA violated the Equal Protection Clause as the law prioritized placement of children based on race rather than understandings of Indigenous nationhood. The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the challenge and upheld ICWA. In doing so, it confirmed Congress has a broad plenary power to legislate with respect to different tribal nations. The equal protection claim was dismissed on the basis of standing.

The panel discussion covered many practical and theoretical implications of the decisions: from the mechanisms and architecture of Bill C-92 for resolving conflict between Indigenous and provincial laws and individual and collective rights, to how the decisions impact the existing division of powers regarding child welfare between federal and provincial governments, to how the lower courts are already interpreting and applying the legislation. A strong theme throughout the discussion was the underlying colonial dimension to the decisions and the unresolved question of inherent Indigenous self-government. Professor Borrows noted that by only recognising that the Bill C-92 legislation “acts as if” there is inherent right to self-government under s 35, the Supreme Court of Canada is not committed to uphold or deny the fact that Indigenous peoples might have an inherent right to self-government in their relationship to their child and family services. On the other hand, Professor Borrows commented this incrementalism has a positive element as Parliament binds itself to proceed as if that right already exists and allows parties to gain experience in exercising responsibilities with regards to child well-being.

Similarly, the colonial dimension also permeates through Haaland v Brackeen in the context of American colonialism. Professor Blackhawk explained that the Supreme Court in upholding ICWA both reaffirmed the power of American colonialism but also expressed concerns over its limits. The Court reaffirmed American colonialism by confirming the power Congress had to colonize Native Americans within the territorial borders of the United States lies in the “powers inherent in sovereignty” in the Constitution of the United States. This term captures a body of laws from the 18th and 19th centuries founded upon concepts such as the law of nations and natural law, which rested on the right of “civilized nations” to govern “savage nations” through forms of colonization. The body of laws was eventually flattened into the plenary power doctrine, where the court withheld using its own review power to oversee the process of colonialism due to the political branches possessing “plenary power”. In this sense, Haaland v Brackeen represents an odd juncture where reconstruction amendments that aim to solve the failure of human enslavement are also furthering the American colonial project.

Sara Mainville brought a critical practitioner viewpoint to the panel and explained the available mechanisms to Indigenous governing bodies in Canada to enforce their own laws and how those mechanisms would interact with existing provincial enforcement systems and laws. Sara first drove home the message that the 19th century governance of the Indian Act is still a reality for Indigenous peoples in Canada, and that governance capacity for Indigenous communities presents a great challenge. However, Bill C-92 does assist Indigenous governing bodies, including section 20(3) of the Act which provides that the laws of an Indigenous governing body who has entered into a coordination agreement, or made reasonable efforts to do so for one year, will have the force of federal law. This section is an example of innovation in Bill C-92 that helps to resolve issues in advance of coordination agreement negotiations.

To reiterate a point made by Professor Blackhawk, there is space for colonized people to share strategies that have been empowering in their colonial jurisdictions. The panel is illustrative of the merits of this.

View the webcast of the panel discussion HERE.

Taoran Li is a Research and Communications Assistant with the Asper Centre. She is an international student from New Zealand attending the Master of Laws program at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law.

Asper Centre Working Group Information Session

Attention all current law students, especially 1L’s!

The Asper Centre will be convening an Information Session on Thurs Sept 12, 2024 in J140 at 12h30 to recruit volunteers for its student working groups. Please join us for lunch and learn how to work with us!

This year, we are excited to support the following student working groups:

  1. Interveners
  2. Encampments and the Charter
  3. The Notwithstanding Clause

Application due date for Student Working Group Proposals

Dear Upper Year JD Students at U of T Law:

We are currently accepting proposals from upper year students who are interested in leading or renewing a student working group at the Asper Centre next year. Please find the Call for Proposals for 2024-25 Asper Centre Working Groups HERE. The application is due at EOD on Thursday August 15, 2024.

Working groups at the Asper Centre provide law students with a unique opportunity to conduct legal research and advocacy on Canadian Constitutional and Charter rights issues, often in partnership with an external organization and members of the bar. Examples of past working groups at the Asper Centre and more information about our working groups may be found at http://aspercentre.ca/clinic/student-working-groups/.

This coming year, the Asper Centre welcomes proposals from students who would be interested in leading a working group focused on indigenous peoples’ rights or children’s rights, however all proposals will be equally consideredIf you would like to apply to lead a working group but need some assistance in developing your working group proposal, please contact tal.schreier@utoronto.ca.

Thank you for your interest and we look forward to working with you.

Successful groups will be notified prior to the start of Fall 2024 term.

Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Reverse Onus Provisions Targeting Repeat Offenders of Intimate Partner Violence

by Katherine Shackleton and Sarah Zaitlin

On December 5th, 2023, Bill C-48 received royal assent in Parliament. Among other reforms to the Criminal Code, the bill expanded the reverse onus provision for offences involving intimate partner violence (IPV). The new reverse onus measures have sparked criticism from community members, advocacy groups, and academics.

Background

Section 11(e) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that “any person charged with an offence has the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause.” Generally, that means the onus is on the Crown to demonstrate why an accused person should be denied bail. The presumption is that bail should be granted unless the Crown can dislodge that presumption.

Reverse onus provisions in the Criminal Code flip the presumption for certain offences, making accused persons bear the onus of dislodging the presumption that bail should be denied. Bill C-48 expanded existing reverse onus provisions to include offences in which “violence was allegedly used, threatened, or attempted against their intimate partner, and the accused has been previously convicted or discharged under section 730 of an offence in the commission of which violence was used, threatened or attempted against any intimate partner” (Paragraph 515(6)(b.1)). This means that anyone accused of intimate partner violence with a prior conviction or discharge, meaning they may not have any criminal record, will be presumptively held without bail unless they can justify their release.

Legal Significance

Some scholars and community advocates are concerned that Bill C-48 will violate accused persons’ section 11(e) Charter rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted section 11(e) as containing two components. In R v Pearson, Chief Justice Lamer identified these components as, firstly, the right to reasonable bail and, secondly, the right not to be denied bail without just cause.[1] For just cause to be present, Chief Justice Lamer set out two requirements. First, bail must be denied only in a narrow set of circumstances.[2] Secondly, the reason for denying bail must “promote the proper functioning of the bail system.”[3] Examples of objectives connected to the proper functioning of the bail system include public safety,[4] ensuring that the accused does not abscond,[5] and maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice.[6]

The constitutionality of reverse onus provisions has been considered by the SCC on two occasions. In Pearson, the Court upheld a reverse onus provision for accused individuals charged with trafficking and importation offences under the Narcotic Control Act.[7] While the provisions at issue facially denied the right to judicial interim release, the majority held that there was just cause for denying bail given the systematic nature of drug offences[8] and the higher risk that the accused could abscond before trial (based on American and Australian statistics).[9] Additionally, a reverse onus for accused individuals who were charged with another offence while on release for another indictable offence was upheld in Morales because it advanced public safety.[10]

Policy Concerns of Reverse Onuses

Reverse onuses raise a number of pressing policy concerns. First of all, by rendering pretrial detention more likely, expanded reverse onus provisions risk exacerbating the already dire situation in many detention facilities. Descriptions in court decisions of conditions inside Canadian detention facilities paint a grim picture and overcrowding has been identified as an important contributor to the problem.[11]

Additionally, pretrial detention is linked with false guilty pleas. Pretrial detention has a direct and powerful impact on the accused’s cost-benefit analysis.[12] When the onus is on the accused to justify their entitlement to bail, the cost of securing pretrial release is higher, both in terms of the time spent in detention and the cost of hiring a lawyer. Accordingly, reverse onus provisions may incentivize the accused to enter a false guilty plea, not because they are guilty, but to avoid further restriction of their liberty, financial strain, toll on mental and physical health, and the host of other problems which flow from incarceration. Of course, abysmal conditions in detention facilities will only increase the number of such false guilty pleas.

Moreover, the changes are likely to disproportionately impact marginalized community members, especially Black and Indigenous accused persons. In Canada, Black and Indigenous people are already overrepresented in detention.[13] The changes enacted through Bill C-48 are especially concerning because members of Black, Indigenous and other racialized communities are brought into custody for firearm offences at a higher rate than their average incarceration level.[14] Racial profiling and over-policing of Black communities are notable contributors to these elevated numbers.[15]

Reverse Onuses in the IPV Context

The relationship between reverse onuses and IPV is not as straightforward as it may initially seem. On one hand, supporters of reverse onus provisions in the IPV context argue that these provisions can protect victims by preventing continued violence.[16] Plus, other protective measures such as restraining orders are often insufficient to fully shield victims from risk.[17] Bail denial in IPV cases also relieves victims of the burden of escaping the family home by seeking help from shelters or family members.[18]

Yet, pretrial detention may not always serve the best interests of victims and families. For instance, pretrial detention can decrease the flow of income to the family of the accused, as they are no longer able to work while detained.[19] In particular, since it is easier and faster to secure bail when there is no reverse onus on the accused, the use of reverse onus lengthens the period in which the accused is unable to financially contribute to their family. Depending on how important the accused’s income is to the family, the increased likelihood of pretrial detention could risk disincentivizing reporting.[20]

Furthermore, as the Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies (CAEFS), Luke’s Place, and the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) pointed out in their brief on Bill C-48 submitted to the Senate, the line between victim and perpetrator is not always clear-cut. This is especially true now that reverse onuses apply to individuals who were previously discharged (meaning found guilty, but with no criminal record). For example, in a sample of twenty-five Black women in Ontario who were victims of IPV, fifteen of them had also been charged with IPV-related offences.[21] Additionally, as a result of pro-charging policies for IPV incidents, victims may be charged along with their partner as dual perpetrators. According to Jonathan Rudin of Aboriginal Legal Services, discharges are often granted to such victims who plead guilty to avoid consequences such as losing their kids.[22]

The Federal Ombudsperson for Victims of Crime made submissions to the Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs related to the study of Bill C-48. The submission emphasized that safety of intimate partner violence survivors should be a paramount consideration in bail decisions.[23] The Ombudsperson submitted that Courts should consider coercive and controlling behaviours exhibited by accused persons in the context of IPV, as well as patterns of criminal harassment, when considering the release of accused persons on bail.[24] Bill C-48 partially incorporates this recommendation by responding to patterns of recorded accusations of violent behaviour.

Government Position

In their Charter statement on Bill C-48, the government maintains that the amendments expanding pretrial detention are “targeted” and cover only “specific and narrow circumstances.”[25] With respect to firearms, the government notes that the changes are directed at ensuring the effectiveness of firearm regulation, increasing public safety, and preserving confidence in the administration of justice.[26] On the expansion of reverse onuses for repeat violent offences (like IPV), the government stresses that these individuals have a higher risk of reoffending and the amendments therefore advance public safety objectives.[27]

Conclusion

Reverse onuses for bail force an accused person who has not been convicted of a crime to demonstrate why they should be released on bail, or else be presumptively held. The government justifies the additional reverse onus provisions introduced by Bill C-48 by contending that they will increase safety for the public, victims of some crimes (including IPV), and confidence in the administration of justice. On the other hand, the SCC has held repeatedly that such a limitation on the Charter rights of the accused must occur in only limited and narrowly tailored circumstances. There is a concern that these new reverse onus provisions do not meet the standards required by the SCC holdings in Pearson and Morales, but as Bill C-48 is new and has not yet been constitutionally challenged, it is yet to be seen whether the Bill will withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Katherine Shackleton and Sarah Zaitlin are rising 2L JD Candidates at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law and were members of the Asper Centre’s Bail Reform Student Working Group in 2023-2024.

[1] 1992 CanLII 52 at para 47 (SCC) [Pearson].

[2] Pearson, supra note 1 at para 60.

[3] Ibid.

[4] R v Morales, 1992 CanLII 53 at para 40 (SCC) [Morales].

[5] Pearson, supra note 1 at para 68.

[6] R v Hall, 2002 SCC 64 at para 27.

[7] Pearson, supra note 1 at para 69.

[8] Pearson, supra note 1 at para 63.

[9] Pearson, supra note 1 at paras 64-5.

[10] Morales, supra note 4 at para 64.

[11] Cheryl Marie Webster, “Remanding Justice for the Innocent: Systemic Pressures in Pretrial Detention to Falsely Plead Guilty in Canada” (2022) 3:2 Wrongful Conviction L Rev 128 at 146.

[12] Ibid at 143.

[13] See e.g. R v Summers, 2014 SCC 26 at para. 67; Statistics Canada, Overrepresentation of Black People in the Canadian Criminal Justice System” (15 December 2022), online: <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/obpccjs-spnsjpc/index.html>.

[14] Association of Legal Aid Plans of Canada, “Brief submitted by the Association of Legal Aid Plans of Canada (ALAP) to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Standing Committee regarding Bill C-48: An Act to amend the Criminal Code (bail reform)” (22 September 2023), online: <https://sencanada.ca/Content/Sen/Committee/441/LCJC/briefs/2023-09-22_LCJC_C-48_Brief_ALAP_e.pdf>.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Cassandra Richards, “Learning from Those on the Ice: The Impact of Bill C-75 on Nunavummiut” (2019) 51:1 Ottawa L Rev 157 at 170.

[17] Brynn E. Sheehan et al., “Intimate Partner Homicide: New Insights for Understanding Lethality and Risks” (2015) 21:2 Violence Against Women 269 at 280.

[18] Dawn Beichner et al., “A Legal and Policy Argument for Bail Denial and Preventative Treatment for Batterers in the United States” (2017) 28:4 Crim Just Pol’y Rev 311 at 312.

[19] Richards, supra note 16 at 183.

[20] Emily Ng & Heather Douglas, “Domestic and Family Violence and the Approach to Bail” (2016) 34:2 Law in Context 36 at 55.

[21] Patrina Duhaney, “Criminalized Black Women’s Experiences of Intimate Partner Violence in Canada” (2022) 28:11 Violence Against Women 2765 at 2770.

[22] Jacques Gallant, “Ottawa passes long-awaited bail reform bill under intense pressure from police, the premiers” , Toronto Star (30 November 2023), online: <https://www.thestar.com/politics/federal/ottawa-passes-long-awaited-bail-reform-bill-under-intense-pressure-from-police-the-premiers/article_43913181-d6f5-5c30-942f-b54d9b0f2813.html>.

[23] Office of the Federal Ombudsperson for Victims of Crime, “Submission to the Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs: Study of Bill C-48 An Act To Amend the Criminal Code (Bail Reform)” (18 October 2023), online: <https://sencanada.ca/Content/Sen/Committee/441/LCJC/briefs/LCJC_C-48_Brief_Ombudsperson_e.pdf>.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Department of Justice (Canada), “Charter Statement: Bill C-48: An Act to amend the Criminal Code (bail reform)” (27 November 2023), online: <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/pl/charter-charte/c48.html>.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.