Constitutional Roundtable

Constitutional Roundtable with Professor Richard Bellamy

The David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights’ Constitutional Roundtables are an annual series of lunchtime discussion forums that provide an opportunity to consider developments in Canadian constitutional theory and practice.  The Constitutional Roundtable series promotes scholarship and aims to make a meaningful contribution to intellectual discourse about Canadian constitutional law.

The Asper Centre is pleased to present a lunchtime Constitutional Roundtable by Professor Richard Bellamy (Professor of Political Science at the University College of London) on Tuesday November 12, 2024, at 12h45 EST on “Democracy through Courts?” based on a chapter of his forthcoming book titled Defending the Political Constitution. 

ABSTRACT: The democratic critique of judicial review by constitutional courts has prompted its defenders to counter that courts have democratic qualities as good as, and in certain respects even stronger than, conventional democratic politics. This article offers a critical analysis of three arguments favouring this approach. The first argues that constitutional courts operate as exemplars of democratic deliberation. In particular, they give expression to the public reasons underlying democracy and ensure democratic practice does not subvert its ideals. The second holds that rights-based litigation offers a form of democratic participation, providing a voice to those who might have been excluded from electoral democracy. The third contends that judges operate in a similar way to elected representatives, who are best conceived as trustees rather than as delegates. All three views are found wanting. Courts do possess certain limited democratic qualities. However, they are not intrinsic features of courts themselves. They arise from their being dependent upon rather than independent from the conventional democratic process.

*All are welcome * Light Lunch provided * No Registration Required*

Asper Centre Panel on Indigenous Child Welfare & Self-Governance

Asper Centre Constitutional Roundtable Presents a Panel on

Indigenous Child Welfare & Self-Governance

with Prof John Borrows (the Loveland Chair of Indigenous Law, UofT Law), Prof Maggie Blackhawk (NYU Law) & Sara Mainville (JFK Law LLP)

Moderated by Asper Centre ED, Cheryl Milne

Thursday, October 31, 2024 at 12:30pm – 2:00pm (in person or virtual)

Room J130, Jackman Law Building, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto

All are welcome * Light lunch will be provided * Registration Required

REGISTER HERE

Background

Over the past few years, both Canadian and American courts have decided cases that impact Indigenous Nations’ ability to care for Indigenous children. Both countries have histories and present realities of removing Indigenous children from Indigenous homes, thereby jeopardizing the safety of Indigenous children and undermining Indigenous Nations’ sovereignty and governance. With this context in mind, the recent Supreme Court of the United States Haaland v Brackeen decision, and the Supreme Court of Canada Attorney General of Québec, et al. v. Attorney General of Canada, et al decisions are of paramount importance to Indigenous sovereignty and safety. Both cases address federal legislation introduced to address the historic and ongoing harms caused by the apprehension of Indigenous children by settler governments. In both countries, these decisions also demonstrate how child welfare is closely connected to Indigenous assertions of and rights to self-government.

The Asper Centre Indigenous Rights Working Group is pleased to present a panel event to unpack the significant legal issues and potential future implications of these cases, with a focus on the Quebec Reference case and its meaning for the interpretation of Section 35 of the Constitution and Indigenous self-governance.

Panelists

Maggie Blackhawk (Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Ojibwe) is professor of law at NYU and a prize-winning scholar and teacher of federal Indian law, constitutional law, and legislation. Blackhawk was awarded the American Society for Legal History’s William Nelson Cromwell Article Prize and her research has been published or is forthcoming in the Harvard Law Review, Stanford Law Review, Yale Law Journal, Supreme Court Review, American Historical Review, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Journal of the Early Republic, and Journal of Politics. Much of her scholarship explores the relationship between law and power, with a particular emphasis on the ways that subordinated peoples leverage law to shift power to their communities—especially outside of rights and courts-based frameworks. Her recent projects have focused on the laws and legal histories of American colonialism and the central role of the American colonial project, including the resistance and advocacy of Native and other colonized peoples, in shaping the constitutional law and history of the United States.

Sara Mainville is a partner at JFK Law LLP and has been a member of the Ontario bar since 2005 and she is a member of the BC bar (2022) with specific matter approvals to practice in Nunavut and Quebec. Sara has a Management/Public Administration degree (Lethbridge) and a Bachelor of Laws from Queen’s University. She has a LLM from the University of Toronto and an Advanced Negotiations certificate from Harvard University, and a Certificate in Entertainment Law (Osgoode PD). In 2014, Sara was elected as Chief of Couchiching First Nation after the sudden death of her friend and mentor, Chief Chuck McPherson. Sara uses this experience as a former Chief to help leadership work past difficult issues, within Indigenous forms of dispute resolution, and walk the community through processes to encourage discourse and grassroots solutions to long-held problems. Sara has completed Advanced Negotiations training at Harvard University and dispute resolution, legislative drafting, and mediation training at professional institutes in order to advance her clients’ long held goals for self-determination and truer treaty partnerships in Canada. Sara is generally seen as a subject-matter expert about Crown-Indigenous relations, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Treaty 3, and Anishinaabe Inakonigewin. However, Sara sees herself as a life-long learner willing to meet in community, read voraciously, and listen intently to better understand Indigenous knowledge systems across Canada.

John Borrows B.A., M.A., J.D., LL.M. (Toronto), Ph.D. (Osgoode Hall Law School), LL.D. (Hons., Dalhousie, York, SFU, Queen’s & Law Society of Ontario), D.H.L, (Toronto), F.R.S.C., O.C., is the Loveland Chair in Indigenous Law at the University of Toronto Law School. His publications include, Recovering Canada; The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Donald Smiley Award best book in Canadian Political Science, 2002), Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Canadian Law and Society Best Book Award 2011), Drawing Out Law: A Spirit’s Guide (2010), Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism ((Donald Smiley Award best book in Canadian Political Science, 2016), The Right Relationship (with Michael Coyle, ed.), Resurgence and Reconciliation (with Michael Asch, Jim Tully, eds.), Law’s Indigenous Ethics (2020 Best subsequent Book Award from Native American and Indigenous Studies Association, 2020 W. Wes Pue Best book award from the Canadian Law and Society Association). He is the 2017 Killam Prize winner in Social Sciences and the 2019 Molson Prize Winner from the Canada Council for the Arts, the 2020 Governor General’s Innovation Award, and the 2021 Canadian Bar Association President’s Award winner.  He was appointed as an Officer of the Order of Canada in 2020. John is a member of the Chippewa of the Nawash First Nation in Ontario, Canada.

REGISTER HERE

Constitutional Roundtable with Professors Kerri Froc and Jean-Christophe Bédard-Rubin on the QCCA decision in Hak v. Attorney General of Quebec

The Asper Centre Constitutional Roundtables are an annual series of lunchtime discussion forums that provide an opportunity to consider developments in Canadian constitutional theory and practice. The series promotes scholarship and aims to make a meaningful contribution to intellectual discourse about Canadian and comparative constitutional law.

We are pleased to host Associate Professor Kerri Froc (UNB Law) in conjunction with Assistant Professor Jean-Christophe Bédard-Rubin (U of T Law) for a Constitutional Roundtable on March 13, 2024 in the Solarium, Falconer Hall, Faculty of Law.

Professors Froc and Bédard-Rubin will break down the Quebec Court of Appeal’s decision in Hak et al. c. Procureur général du Québec, concerning the constitutionality of Bill 21, An Act Respecting the Laicity of the State. This appeal concerns freedom of expression, freedom of religion and equality rights, as Muslim women in Quebec who wear religious symbols such as the niqab or hijab would be prohibited from working in certain professions and in most parts of public administration, and prevented from benefitting from some public services because the law requires them to do so with their faces uncovered. The government of Quebec also pre-emptively used the override clause to prevent any constitutional challenges to the legislation. This Constitutional Roundtable will cover what this decision means for Charter rights, gender equality, and state use of the “notwithstanding clause.”

Kerri Froc is an Associate Professor at UNB Law, as well as a Trudeau and Vanier Scholar. She has taught courses at Carleton University, Queen’s University and University of Ottawa on feminist legal theory and various aspects of public law, among others.

Kerri received her PhD from Queen’s University in 2016 and holds a Master of Laws from the University of Ottawa, a Bachelor of Laws from Osgoode Hall Law School and a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Regina.

Before completing her doctorate, she spent 18 years as a lawyer, as a civil litigator in Regina, a staff lawyer for the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), and as a staff lawyer in the areas of law reform and equality at the Canadian Bar Association. She is a member of the Saskatchewan and New Brunswick bars.

Assistant Professor Jean-Christophe Bédard-Rubin’s work explores Canadian constitutional culture from historical and comparative perspectives. He studied law, political science, and philosophy at Université Laval, Yale University, and the University of Toronto. During his doctoral studies, Jean-Christophe was the McMurty Fellow of the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History and a Joseph-Armand Bombardier Scholar. He has done consultancy work on constitution-building for International IDEA and, prior to his graduate studies, he worked in litigation for the Quebec Department of Justice.

Bédard-Rubin currently pursues two main research projects. The first is an intellectual history of the foundations of public law in French Canada. This project seeks to reconstruct the intellectual networks in which French Canadian public lawyers participated to excavate the transatlantic influences on the formation of Quebec’s legal syncretism. This genealogical reconstruction recovers the conceptual and theoretical innovations that allowed French Canadians to articulate a genuine theory of the state outside of the revolutionary framework. In so doing, this work sheds a different, somewhat oblique light on Canada’s constitutional experience and questions its status in comparative constitutional scholarship.

The second research project investigates judicial bilingualism in Canada. Using mixed social science methods, this project explores the various empirical impacts of bilingualism on judicial behaviour, the normative significance of legal bilingualism for the authority of judicial decisions, and the ways in which language shapes the dominant conception of the judicial role in Canada’s French and English public spheres.

Jean-Christophe’s work has been published in English and French in the Review of Constitutional Studies, the Canadian Journal of Law & Society, the Osgoode Hall Law Journal, the Bulletin d’histoire politique, and the International Journal of Canadian Studies, amongst others.

All are welcome * Light lunch provided * No registration required

Overcoming Challenges to Implementing UNDRIP in Canada

Posted on by Tal Schreier

By Julia Nowicki

Implementing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in Canadian law will not be without challenges, and will require both hard-work and great care, said Kerry Wilkins at the Asper Centre’s first Constitutional Roundtable for the 2020/2021 academic year. Held virtually on Wednesday, October 28th, 2020, Wilkins, who is an adjunct professor at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, presented his upcoming journal article–“So You Want to Implement UNDRIP…”–set to be published in the University of British Columbia Law Review in the near future.

UNDRIP was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2007. The resolution outlines within it “the rights of indigenous peoples” and “establishes a universal framework of minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world”, according to the UN website. Although initially voting against its adoption, the Canadian government eventually issued a Statement of Support endorsing the principles in UNDRIP and in 2015, announced its full, unqualified support. However, the international resolution is not legally binding in Canada, and requires domestic implementation for the rights and obligations of the State to be realized. In the prior two throne speeches, the Governor General of Canada promised full implementation of UNDRIP, stating in 2020 that “[t]he Government will move forward to introduce legislation to implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples before the end of this year.”

Implementation, as alluded to previously, does not come without its challenges, says Wilkins. “[F]irst, Canadian law isn’t especially well designed to welcome enforceable UNDRIP rights and obligations into it. And second, the colonial experience, mainstream law and governance, has done a great deal already to fragment and to disaggregate ancestral Indigenous communities, destabilize their relationships with traditional territories, and suppress and marginalize key features of their cultures.”

However, Wilkins says that the very “impediments to implementation are among the reasons why implementing the United Nations Declaration in Canadian law is so important”, and putting off implementation will in no way help the process. Sections 27, 38, and 40 of UNDRIP assign the process of implementation to the States, according to Wilkins’ paper. Article 38, for example, provides that “States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration.”

In considering how meaningfully to implement UNDRIP, attention must be drawn to two overarching issues, including what Wilkins refers to as the “what” and the “how” of implementation. These questions refer, respectively, to the substantive and procedural issues that may underlie the process.

The instrument leaves undefined certain key features, including who qualifies as Indigenous peoples, how to distinguish traditional lands or territories, and which practices and features can be subject to cultural protection rights. Wilkins suggests that, if left to their own devices, courts and Parliament may revert to applying the metrics with which they are already familiar. Unfortunately, in doing so, or if left to define key concepts within UNDRIP unilaterally, governments and courts run the risk of trivializing the rights that would otherwise be protected. Non-Indigenous governments, for instance, do not have particular experience in thinking about indigeneity. Bands or First Nations as defined by the Indian Act outline criteria that would be “neither necessary nor sufficient to qualify as an Indigenous peoples for the purposes of UNDRIP”, Wilkins says. In reference to rights related to traditional lands or territories, Courts may be tempted to apply the law of Aboriginal Title, reverting to a process that is not only time consuming but likewise reduces the rights contained in UNDRIP to those already protected under the Canadian Constitution. Similar considerations run true for Aboriginal rights.

Various procedural issues must likewise be taken into consideration, namely, by which vehicle implementation should occur. Wilkins provides in his paper two such avenues, including by way of treaty and by legislation. Both have certain benefits and disadvantages, however the Canadian government as mentioned previously, has promised legislation as a means of implementation. Although legislation may provide for uniformity across the country, it can likewise be tailored to apply to specific groups. However, rights contained within legislation implementing UNDRIP, unlike treaties, would not receive constitutional protection. Further, legislation is subject to being overridden, not only by subsequent or more specific legislation, but likewise is subject to potential repeal by subsequent governments which may differ in their constituency and platform. Such potential conflict must be taken into careful consideration when drafting UNDRIP legislation, to ensure that subsequent laws are subject to UNDRIP unless explicitly stated within said legislation, UNDRIP legislation cannot be replaced by subsequent governments unless by certain manner and form requirements such as a supermajority vote, or by including explicit provisions that bind both federal and provincial Crowns.

“It’s important as we embark on the project of implementation to acknowledge at the outset the difficulties that it’s going to involve,” Wilkins said. “But it’s equally important not to let the existence of those difficulties count as a reason not to make the effort at implementation.”

Julia Nowicki is a 2L JD student at the Faculty of Law and is currently an Asper Centre work-study student.

Access recording of the Constitutional Roundtablewith Kerry Wilkins HERE.

 

Courts Without Cases: The Law and Politics of Advisory Opinions

Posted on by Tal Schreier

By Kylie de Chastelain

The Asper Centre recently hosted Professor Carissima Mathen, author of Courts Without Cases: The Law and Politics of Advisory Opinions (2019), for a dynamic Constitutional Roundtable about her new book, with Professor Lorraine Weinrib as discussant.

Professor Mathen’s book, described by Professor Weinrib as a “milestone” in Canadian Constitutional writing, explores the under-studied but vitally important institution of Supreme Court references. References are opinions given in the absence of a live case. They are put forward to the Court by the executive branch and the opinions that result are called “advisory opinions.” Those who have studied constitutional law will be familiar with references, but what many don’t realize is that some of Canada’s most important judicial decisions did not emerge from cases, but from references. Same-sex marriage, assisted human reproduction, Senate Reform, Quebec secession and patriation are only some of the landmark opinions that have emerged from references. In Professor Mathen’s words, each constitutes an important “constitutional moment,” and yet, references have remained chronically unexplored by legal scholars. Mathen has sought to change that through her book, which is the first focused examination of references in Canadian legal scholarship.

References are not uniquely Canadian but the way they are handled by our judicial system sets Canada apart from other Anglo-American countries. In South Africa, Israel, India, and numerous European countries, specialist “constitutional courts” address a variety of issues through references. As Professor Mathen emphasized, what is notable about the Canadian context is that the Supreme Court performs “both an adjudicative and an advisory function.” This function was enumerated in the Supreme and Exchequer Court Act, which created the Supreme Court of Canada, in 1875.

Professor Weinrib suggested that the reference phenomenon was institutionalized “by accident,” but that it was much needed, in part because Canada’s formal written constitution was initially fragmented and incomplete. In particular, the lack of a domestic amending formula made it very difficult for the federal government to govern. The reference function allowed federal and provincial governments to raise questions and discern the legal elements of political issues before bringing them back to the legislature; effectively using the court to establish a guiding framework for the nation’s development. This dynamic also allowed the executive to pre-emptively explore important legal issues before a case emerged and a decision was handed down in a conventional trial.

However, in the present day, Professor Mathen has argued that references and advisory opinions pose two potential problems with regard to Canada’s federal system. The separation of powers is essential to how the Canadian state operates, but by vesting courts with the ability to do more than adjudicate cases, references might be viewed as extending the judicial function beyond its optimal boundaries. In addition, because references can only be put forward by the executive branch, they arguably align the judiciary and the executive and exclude the legislature, even though the issues addressed in references are often very salient to the legislative context. Further, this arrangement could give the impression that the court is subservient to the executive; threatening the idea that the judiciary is independent. Courts are expected to address the references put forward to them, but as Professor Mathen explained, the Supreme Court is not always so accommodating.

On several occasions, the Supreme Court has refused to engage with the references put to them by the executive. Sometimes, the Court has rejected the requests outright, and in other cases it has re-interpreted the questions asked. By way of illustration, Professor Mathen pointed to the Patriation Reference, where the executive asked whether there was a constitutional problem with amending the constitution without provincial consent. In its opinion, the Court divided on its interpretation of the question, exploring whether all provinces – or only some provinces – had to agree with a constitutional amendment in order for it to pass.

Most interesting in Professor Mathen’s view is the fact that the Supreme Court has never explained why it sometimes chooses to refuse reference requests. Section 53(4) of the Supreme Court Act stipulates that the court has a duty to hear and consider all references, but despite this, the Court reserves the right to ignore references outright or to ignore sub-questions in a given reference, as it did in the Same-sex Marriage Reference.  Here, the Court refused to answer Question 4 of the reference, which asked if the opposite-sex requirement for marriage for civil purposes was consistent with the Charter. ostensibly because it was concerned about any “confusion” that could emerge if it answered in the negative.  More specifically, the Court stated that it would “exercise its discretion” not to answer the question, in part because the federal government had “stated its intention to address the issue of same-sex marriage legislatively regardless of the Court’s opinion” and that answering Question 4 could potentially undermine the government’s “stated goal of achieving uniformity in respect of civil marriage across Canada” if it answered the question affirmatively. Mathen suggested that the Court’s refusal to answer demonstrates the intention of the Court to retain first and foremost a legal role, as the chief constitutional arbiter, and the primary interpreter of its norms.

Here lies a final and fascinating point about Supreme Court references: they are not legally binding. References are only advisory and technically co-exist with treatises, textbooks, and other scholarly legal works that have no authoritative control over judges and their decisions. But practically speaking, we do not treat references in this way. As Professor Weinrib pointed out, references serve an incredibly important function in establishing norms. Indeed, we treat references as legally binding decisions; they are taught in law schools alongside other case law, and are treated by legislatures and governments with the same gravity as a binding Supreme Court decision. This could be, as Professor Weinrib suggested, because references sometimes feel more methodologically sophisticated; more conceptual and holistic. References help to develop a rule of law that reflects fundamental constitutional principles from the outset. This is undeniably a strength of the dynamic that exists in Canada.

Ultimately, Professor Mathen has produced an accessible and engaging account of the reference power in Canada, which, for all its curiosities, is undoubtedly an integral aspect of Canadian judicial practice and legal development.

Kylie de Chastelain is a 1L student of law at the University of Toronto and the current Asper Centre work-study student.