Supreme Court of Canada

Selected responses to R v Comeau

Posted on by Student

By Sara Tatelman

Beer remains imprisoned by provincial borders. In 2012, Gerard Comeau of Tracadie, N.B. was fined nearly $300 for bringing 15 cases of beer and three bottles of spirits from Quebec to New Brunswick. His battle against the law behind that fine has finally wound its way up through the courts.

Last month, in the final word on the matter, the Supreme Court of Canada reversed the trial judge’s decision and found constitutional s. 134(b) of the New Brunswick Liquor Control Act, which limits the amount of extra-provincial Canadian alcohol individuals can bring into the province. The Court determined laws that aim to curtail the inter-provincial passage of goods, whether directly through tariffs or indirectly through fines, violate s. 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which states that all items manufactured in any province must be “admitted free” into the other provinces. But laws with different aims that incidentally curtail such passage do not violate s. 121. In this case, the Court noted the legislation aims “not to restrict trade across a provincial boundary, but to enable public supervision of the production, movement, sale and use of alcohol within New Brunswick” (para 124). Furthermore, the impugned provision targets black market bourbon and Fredericton-brewed rotgut, as well as cheap Quebec beer and crisp Okanagan Pinot Gris. So the liquor limits are byproducts of another regulatory scheme, and therefore permissible.

Before addressing the constitutionality of s. 134(b), the Court “deliver[ed] a benchslap to the trial judge” for disregarding its 1921 decision in Gold Seal Ltd. V Attorney-General for the Province of Alberta, as Professor Leonid Sirota of the Auckland University of Technology Law School wrote on his blog, Double Aspect. Based on the Bedford and Carter exceptions to vertical stare decisis, the trial judge ignored precedent because of a new historical assessment of the intent behind s. 121. The Court determined this wasn’t sufficient, since “the underlying social context that framed the original legal debate [must be] profoundly altered” (para 31) and such a re-assessment doesn’t do so.

Ironically, Sirota argues, the Court doesn’t uphold Gold Seal either. In that decision, outright tariffs on inter-provincial trade are banned. But post-Comeau, provinces could impose tariffs as long as they’re rationally connected to a regulatory scheme with a non-trade objective. “So much for stare decisis,” he writes.

In a commentary in the National Post, Professor David Schneiderman of the University of Toronto Faculty of Law notes it’s unsurprising the Court gives little weight to the historical context, “to some imagined framing moment derived almost exclusively from the pen of a single British draftsperson.” That is, under the “living tree” interpretation of the Constitution, purported intentions don’t matter all that much.

Professor Malcolm Lavoie of the University of Alberta Faculty of Law argues in a CBC column that the Court could have reached a fairer balance between federal and provincial powers by simply mandating a test more robust than rational connection, such as a test of necessity. “Under this approach, the government of New Brunswick would have had to establish that its prohibition on outside liquor was truly necessary to achieve objectives relating to public health and safety, a much higher bar than the one the Court applied,” he writes.

Furthermore, Lavoie points out that the Court’s interpretation of s. 121 renders it obsolete: under s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, interprovincial trade is a federal head of power. That is, it was already impossible for provincial governments to directly impose tariffs on goods coming in from other provinces.

In the Toronto Star, Dr. Maria Banda, a visiting fellow at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, has a more positive view of the decision. Comeau ensures that provinces with higher environmental or health standards, for example, don’t risk “being dragged down to the lowest common denominator by those with lax or inexistent regulations,” she writes.

This decision will likely reverberate throughout the country, including in Alberta and British Columbia’s pipeline dispute. Those provinces should see Comeau as a warning “that they’re not going to be able to rely on their own jurisdiction under the Constitution to do things that will either interfere in federal jurisdiction or will interrupt the free flow of natural resources that is normally supposed to occur without discrimination between provinces,” Professor Carissima Mathen of the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, said in an interview in Maclean’s.

For his part, Schneiderman argues it’s now less likely Alberta’s Bill 12 will be held to be constitutional. The principle aim of the bill, which requires government permission to export petroleum resources, is “to economically harm a recalcitrant province for interfering with Alberta’s ability to get its oil to port,” he writes. And under Comeau, that cannot be countenanced.

So is it time to #FreeTheBeer, #FreeTheGrapes and #FreeTheOil?

Sara Tatelman is the Asper Centre’s 2018 summer research assistant.

Asper Centre Clinic Student Reflects on Drafting the Bird Intervention Factum

Posted on by Tal Schreier

by Becky Lockert

This past fall, the Supreme Court of Canada granted the Asper Centre leave to intervene in R v Bird, a case that ties questions of access to justice and constitutionalism to the doctrine of collateral attack. The question at the heart of the case is, from the Asper Centre’s perspective, whether a court applying the collateral attack doctrine must explicitly consider countervailing factors to ensure that administrative orders are Charter compliant.

Mr. Bird, the appellant, was labelled a long-term offender and, upon the completion of his prison sentence, was subject to certain supervisory conditions. Although he had requested that he be released into his First Nations community, the Parole Board ordered Mr. Bird to reside in a community correctional facility. Notably, this community correctional facility is the same one where he served the end of his prison sentence.

On a January evening two years ago, Mr. Bird left his assigned correctional facility and did not return. Police apprehended Mr. Bird several months later, leading to a charge of breaching a long-term supervision order and the threat of up to ten years in prison.

At trial, Mr. Bird successfully argued that the imposition of the residency condition was contrary to s. 7 of the Charter and outside the statutory authority of the Parole Board, because continued incarceration cannot be a condition imposed by a long-term supervision order. Allowing the appeal, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that Mr. Bird was precluded from challenging the legality of the supervision order condition. To make such an attack, the Court of Appeal concluded, would be allowing a collateral attack and contrary to legislative intent.

The Supreme Court granted leave to intervene to the Asper Centre in September 2017. The intervention team, consisting of Cheryl Milne (Asper Centre Executive Director) , Breese Davis (the Asper Centre’s 2017-18 Constitutional Litigator-in-Residence), and five clinic students, had six weeks to prepare our intervenor factum. Our task was to craft an argument that the Court, when determining whether to bar a collateral attack, should consider both the constitutionality of the administrative order and access to justice.

Cheryl and Breese immediately gave the reins to our small group of students. Gaining familiarity with the subject-matter was our first step; we assigned out research and set off to produce memos. Meeting regularly and communicating constantly, the group narrowed our issues and determined our approach. We would advocate for adding two branches to the collateral attack framework (from the Supreme Court’s judgment in R v Consolidated Maybrun Mines Ltd.).

First: courts cannot be complicit in the enforcement of unconstitutional administrative orders by refusing collateral attack against them. This would be contrary to the rule of law and the principle of constitutionalism. Especially in this case, where Mr. Bird’s liberty interest is at stake, compliance with the Charter cannot be left out from the Court’s analysis.

Second: courts should take note of access to justice challenges that make judicial review of administrative orders essentially inaccessible. Charter protections cannot be rendered meaningless by an effective inability to challenge potentially unconstitutional conditions.

Having determined our strategy, the drafting process began. For a number of us, this was to be our first factum. Cheryl and Breese put great faith in the group to craft the Centre’s written argument, providing helpful (and at times, challenging) feedback to our work-in-progress. The ability to maximize on Cheryl’s expertise in drafting intervenors’ facta and Breese’s wealth of knowledge as a seasoned criminal defence lawyer was immeasurably helpful. There were a series of late nights at the Faculty, including line-by-line group editing sessions where we wrote and re-wrote sections of the factum.

Following a series of drafts, more line-by-line edits, and finally a submission to Cheryl and Breese, we had our finished product. A few final tweaks on their end, and the factum was submitted to the Court and out of our hands.

The prospect of the Supreme Court reading our writing is a daunting one for students – daunting, but exciting. The Court will be hearing oral submissions on the case this upcoming March, and many of our student group will be coming along to see our arguments in action. How will the Court approach our arguments? Is our position persuasive, and will the Court accept the position that access to justice and constitutionalism must be considered?

Having this opportunity to draft an intervenor factum has been invaluable for our student group. On a personal note, I can attest to this being the most meaningful and challenging part of my law school career thus far. Being surrounded by four other dedicated and bright law students and having guidance from highly skilled supervising lawyers has resulted in a piece of work and an experience that I am proud to have been a part of.

Becky Lockert is a 2L JD Candidate at the Faculty of Law and was a student in the Asper Centre Clinical Legal Education Course.

Asper Centre at the Supreme Court of Canada Twice Next Month

Posted on by Tal Schreier

 

The Asper Centre will be at the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) as an intervener in two separate cases next month: Gillian Frank v Attorney General of Canada and Spencer Dean Bird v Her Majesty the Queen.

First up on March 16, 2018 is our intervention in Bird, an important case about prisoners’ rights in Canada.  In this case, the appellant was sentenced to a penitentiary term followed by a period of long-term supervision. The Parole Board determined that this supervision would begin with the appellant residing at a community correctional centre. Upon completing his penitentiary term, the appellant arrived to the designated correctional centre to commence the period of long-term supervision but soon left. He was apprehended and charged with failure to comply with the conditions of his long-term supervision. He argued that the residency requirement was unlawful. The trial judge agreed, finding that his being forced to reside in penal institution after completion of his prison term violated his s. 7 Charter rights. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, ruling that the trial judge erred in permitting the appellant to collaterally attack the residency requirement.

The Asper Centre factum argues, with regard to the proper application of the collateral attack doctrine, that the Maybrun framework should consider constitutional and access to justice issues. Our factum can be found here.

Less than a week later, on March 21, 2018, the Asper Centre will be intervening in Frank, a case focused on the voting rights of Canadians residing outside of Canada. In Frank, the applicants are Canadian citizens residing in the United States for employment reasons, who intend to return to Canada if circumstances permit. Both applicants were refused voting ballots for the 2011 Canadian General Election since they had been resident outside Canada for five years or more. The applicants sought a declaration that certain provisions of the Canada Elections Act violated their Charter-protected right to vote. A judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice declared the impugned provisions of the Act unconstitutional by reason of violating the applicants’ right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter, and the violation was not justifiable under s. 1.

The Asper Centre factum addresses the “social contract” argument that has been used to support revoking a Canadian citizen’s right to vote if they do not live in Canada. Our factum can be found here.

 

 

Panel Discussion with TWU Interveners’ Counsel

Posted on by Tal Schreier

By Erika Voaklander and Solomon McKenzie

At the end of 2017 the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) heard arguments in the two Trinity Western University (TWU) appeals. The results of the appeals may have wide and deep impacts on the legal profession and on Canada more broadly.

On January 18, 2018, the Asper Centre, Out in Law UofT, the Journal of Law and Equality, and the Christian Legal Fellowship of UofT Law co-hosted a discussion panel, showcasing counsel for interveners on the TWU appeals. The panelists were Joanna Radbord (Advocates’ Society), Angela Chaisson (LGBTOUT), Barry Bussey (Canadian Council of Christian Charities), Paul Jonathan Saguil (Start Proud/Outlaws), Derek Ross (Christian Legal Fellowship), and Chris Palliare (Advocates’ Society).

Trinity Western University is a private Christian university in British Columbia. TWU wanted to open a law school. The school provides an education founded on evangelical Christian principles. TWU’s approach to community development is expressed in a community covenant, a code of conduct that encourages its students to live by Biblical teachings. Amongst other considerations, the covenant prohibits sexual intimacy that violates the sacredness of marriage, as defined as between a man and a woman. Unmarried individuals are expected to live celibate lives. While LGBTQ students are permitted to attend the university, TWU would prohibit admission to its law school if a student refuses to sign the covenant.

The appeals involve legal challenges to decisions by the law societies of Ontario and British Columbia. Ontario decided to deny the accreditation of future TWU law graduates. The Court of Appeal of Ontario held that Law Society of Ontario’s (LSO) statutory mandate to act in the public interest entitled it to refuse to accredit TWU’s law school. The LSO refused to accredit on the basis that the covenant was discriminatory. BC, on the other hand, initially approved accreditation, but reversed this decision based upon a referendum it held with members. The BC Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision to overturn this second decision.

The panel discussion explored the case, other legal precedents and wider considerations of constitutional advocacy. In their general discussion of the case, Chris Palliare highlighted that the SCC’s decision would likely hang on how the court defines and places boundaries on the freedom of religion enshrined in the s. 2(a) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Additionally, Barry Bussey noted that this issue also turns on jurisdiction, notably whether the Law Society of Ontario has the right to bar membership.

An early fault line in the discussion was when the panelists considered the 2001 TWU v British Columbia College of Teachers (BCCT) case. Both Angela Chaisson and Joanna Radbord suggested that there have been many social and legal changes around LGBTQ+ rights since the finding in BCCT. Angela Chaisson asserted that the two cases were overwhelmingly dissimilar, involving different parties and underlying statutes, and with Canadian society having substantially progressed on LGBTQ+ rights since 2001. By comparison, Barry Bussey asserted the similarities between the two cases, and warned that a finding that essentially overturned BCCT would have a knock-on effect on evangelical and other religious communities’ abilities to continue to operate professional and educational facilities.

In considering the long-term impact of the TWU appeals, Derek Ross stated that the Court was at a crossroads in its recognition of religious communities’ freedom of association (s. 2(d) of the Charter). He warned that there could be deleterious impacts on the rights of religious communities. He noted that the Court supporting the LSO would be tantamount to finding it acceptable for state actors to quash the rights of groups externally assessed to have distasteful beliefs. Chris Palliare questioned the relevance of s. 2(d) to this case, and maintained that the analysis should focus on s. 2(a) religious freedom rights. Both Barry Bussey and Derek Ross stressed that a finding against TWU would have extensive and negative impacts on religious rights.

In considering what this ruling would mean to LGBTQ+ rights, Joanna Radbord noted that given the fixed number of law school spaces, allowing accreditation would diminish the ability for LGBTQ+ students to access law school. She also stressed that drawing evangelical students to one law school would intellectually impoverish the legal community at large, by hindering fruitful and diverse discussion. She highlighted the panel as an example of how law schools should act as meeting places of diverse worldviews. Paul Johnathan Saguil noted that he could have seen himself going to TWU at an early stage in his life, which would have had long term and negative impacts on his development. Angela Chaisson noted that the case was not necessarily zero-sum, and there could still be positive impacts for LGBTQ+ rights encapsulated in an adverse decision.

Finally, the group discussed the impact of the recent changes to the length of submissions by interveners down to 5 minutes of oral advocacy. Chris Palliare intoned that this was a mistake, stressing that the Court should accept fewer interveners, speaking for longer periods. Derek Ross noted that a greater number of perspectives was always welcome. Barry Bussey remarked that the new time limit meant that submissions had to be drafted in a strategic manner. In his preparation, he found that 5-minute submissions constituted 500 spoken words, a very limited space for nuanced reflections. Angela Chaisson agreed that fewer interveners were important, but that the SCC needs to start promoting the voices of people directly affected by the law. She questioned the validity of the court’s initial decision to grant no LGBTQ+ groups intervener status. Joanna Radbord noted the incredible role modelling that comes from having queer women as advocates before the SCC.

All the panelists stressed the importance and rewarding nature of constitutional advocacy. They underscored that interested students and lawyers should seek out pro-bono activities, actively pursue this type of work through their firms, connect to ongoing efforts through their own communities, and look to the David Asper Centre for opportunities.

Erika Voaklander is a 1L JD Candidate and member of Out in Law UofT and Solomon McKenzie is a 2L JD Candidate at the Faculty of Law and is co-leader of Out in Law UofT.

Supreme Court’s Ruling in Recent Extradition Case Disappoints: Comment

Posted on by Tal Schreier

by Patrick Enright

This past week the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in the landmark extradition case of India v Badesha.  The case – which the Asper Centre intervened in earlier this year – involved the possible extradition of an infamous couple to India to face charges of conspiracy to commit murder.  The case raised the intriguing question of when, and if, diplomatic assurances from a foreign state can make extradition to a foreign state Charter-compliant. India, for its part, has a notorious human rights record with respect to treatment of prisoners in its custody. Systemic abuse, sexual assault, a lack of potable water, and cramped living conditions are all endemic throughout the system – and abuse from prison guards is a common occurrence.

The question before the Court was this: can mere assurances of safety from the Indian government make up for all this?

The Supreme Court’s answer seems to be “no.” But much remains uncertain. On the plus side, the Court made it clear that diplomatic assurances cannot, by themselves, make up for evidence of human rights abuses in a foreign country. And the Court made it equally clear that general evidence of widespread human rights abuses can be used as evidence that specific persons will be subject to torture and mistreatment upon extradition to a foreign state.

It also laid out the considerations that must be taken into account when assessing the reliability of assurances against torture. Factors such as the specificity of the assurances, the foreign state’s capacity to comply with the assurances, and the ability to monitor and verify the foreign state’s compliance with assurances must all be considered.

But the good news stops there. Much of the decision’s positive elements are muddled by the Court’s insistence on including a number of policy considerations that, we are told, must also colour the analysis. Courts must in each case consider the relationship between Canada and the recipient state, as well as the seriousness of the offence, when determining whether a surrender order meets constitutional muster.

There is, however, an obvious problem with this. The question of whether policy considerations should tip the scale in favor of extraditing leaves too much discretion in the hands of politicians – instead of the Courts. One only has to look at the fallout from the payment to Omar Khadr to realize that importing political considerations into questions of rights-protection is often a marriage made in hell.

When assessing the role of diplomatic assurances in determining whether extradition is appropriate, then, the question should be a simple one…can the state actually fulfill its promises?

The Asper Centre’s submissions urged the Supreme Court to place this question at the heart of the analysis on judicial review of extradition cases. We urged the Court to require the state to produce evidence that it could fulfill its promises and safeguard the rights of Canadian citizens’ subject to extradition. The court, for its part, only partially heeded our warning – opting instead to list a catalogue of things that are to be considered when assessing a surrender order – some rights-friendly, some not.

The Asper Centre’s outside counsel, John Norris, was also troubled by the court’s deference to the Canadian government on extradition cases, yet he too chose to see the silver lining as the court did in the end uphold the need to carefully consider human rights in extradition cases. “You can see it as the glass is half-full or half-empty. I prefer to see it as half-full because the emphasis on human rights is an important part of the judgment,” Norris commented.

As the proverbial wisdom has always said: sometimes you win, and sometimes you lose. And sometimes you lose, but the result isn’t quite as bad as you thought it might be.

And I guess that’s something.

Patrick Enright is a third-year JD candidate at the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Law and was a student in the Asper Centre half time clinic, who assisted with the Asper Centre’s intervention in this case.