Administrative law

What Does Vavilov Mean for Constitutional Issues in Administrative Law?

Posted on by Tal Schreier

by Cheryl Milne

It seems like a lifetime ago that I last attended an in-person legal conference. It was only March 9th, and while the specter of COVID-19 was present (there were hand sanitizer dispensers at the elevator banks and we all used them), social distancing was not yet a phrase on everyone’s tongue as we sat shoulder to shoulder in the downtown conference facility. The conference hosted by Osgoode Hall Law School was a day-long examination of the Supreme Court of Canada’s long-awaited administrative law decision, Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65. I was asked to discuss its implications for constitutional issues.

The short answer is that the decision poses more questions than answers. The long version is what I think can be covered in a blog post rather than an academic paper. Hence, my attempt, from the relatively safe confines of my kitchen, to summarize what I said on March 9th and what I have thought about it since. I should add that I was joined on this two-person panel by Senwung Luk of OKT LLP, who addressed the implications for the duty to consult and accommodate, and whose succinct answer to that question was, “utter chaos.”

For those of you who were not hanging on the edge of your seats for the duration of 2019 awaiting the Court’s pronouncement on the standard of review in administrative law, the appeal involved the judicial review of the decision of the Registrar of Citizenship to cancel the Canadian citizenship of the Canadian-born son of parents later revealed to be Russian spies – their story served as inspiration for the television series, The Americans. That got some of your attention!

I don’t propose to analyze the Court’s overall approach to the administrative law questions and the standard of review here. For a more comprehensive treatment, I suggest Paul Daly’s blog Administrative Law Matters which links to his longer paper posted on SSRN. My task was to discuss the constitutional issues that the majority purported not to address.

In refusing to comment on its earlier administrative law decision in Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, the Court leaves open many questions. Doré established that the standard of review of an administrative decision that impacted Charter rights was reasonableness, rather than the application of the Oakes test under s. 1 of the Charter, but in keeping with the general theme of proportionality under s.1, the decision needed to be a proportional balancing of the Charter right with the governing statutory objective. This approach was reiterated in Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12 and the Trinity Western decisions (referenced below). It remains controversial, with critics claiming that it fails to respect the primary or priority of Charter rights[1] and fails to place the onus on government for justifying a limitation on rights as is required under s. 1 of the Charter.[2]

The majority states clearly that “constitutional matters require a final and determinate answer from the courts” (para.55), thus attracting the correctness standard of review. But that applies only to constitutional questions, such as a challenge to the constitutional validity of legislation. The majority of the Court goes on to state,

However, it is important to draw a distinction between cases in which it is alleged that the effect of the administrative decision being reviewed is to unjustifiably limit rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (as was the case in Doré) and those in which the issue on review is whether a provision of the decision maker’s enabling statute violates the Charter… [para. 57]

 

 

 

So, you might ask what is so unclear about that? The reasonableness standard continues to apply to the Doré set of cases, while challenges to statutes require the standard of correctness. But the Court interchanges constitutional questions with the term constitutional matters, which include federalism issues and treaty rights, and glosses over any confusion that could arise over what could fit within that category. For example, the Ontario Courts of Justice Act defines a constitutional question as one that invokes the constitutional validity or applicability of a statutory provision as well as a claim for a constitutional remedy under s.24(1) of the Charter. Does this mean that the standard of correctness applies to a claim for a constitutional remedy based on government action as opposed to the validity of a statute, as anticipated by R v Conway, 2010 SCC 22?

To illustrate the Court’s inconsistency on this issue alone, one need only look to the case of Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulators, 2017 SCC 1, admittedly not a judicial review, but a case that provides confusing analysis about what constitutes a constitutional question. The plaintiff was seeking Charter damages against the administrative body for allegedly infringing her Charter right to freedom of expression. The regulator raised the statutory provision that barred claims against it to seek a dismissal of the proceedings, while Ernst argued that the provision could not be interpreted so as to prevent a Charter claim. A minority of the Court agreed with the regulator’s interpretation that the legislation barred a damages claim, suggesting the Ernst ought to have sought a judicial review instead. Their ruling dismissing the appeal became the majority decision when Justice Abella reasoned that the claim should be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to file a Notice of Constitutional Question to have the provision declared unconstitutional. If that sounds confusing to you, you are not alone.

A further constitutional matter that could also fall within the category of general questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole, which is another category requiring the correctness standard of review, is the consistent interpretation of a Charter right itself. As McLachlin, C.J. (as she then was) noted in her concurring reasons in Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32, possibly conflating reasonableness and correctness in this context,

…[T]he scope of the guarantee of the Charter right must be given a consistent interpretation regardless of the state actor, and it is the task of the courts on judicial review of a decision to ensure this. A decision based on an erroneous interpretation of a Charter right will be unreasonable. Canadians should not have to fear that their rights will be given different levels of protection depending on how the state has chosen to delegate and wield its power. [para. 116]

 

 

 

 

In stating that it was not revisiting Doré, the majority said that “reconsideration of [its approach to the standard of review of reasonableness was] not germaine to the issues in this appeal” [para.57]. To properly examine this statement, one needs to dip one’s toe into the majority’s revised reasonableness framework. In asserting that the role of the reviewing court is to review and not to decide the issues themselves, the majority states that the review does not entail an “attempt to ascertain the ‘range’ of possible conclusions that would have been open to the decision maker” [para.83]. This specifically contradicts the language of Doré [para. 56] in respect of the proportionality analysis and the approach to judicial review generally enunciated in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [para. 47]. The Court reiterated this pre-Vavilov approach in Trinity Western University v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 33, where Justice Abella stated for the majority,

The reviewing court must consider whether there were other reasonable possibilities that would give effect to Charter protections more fully in light of the objectives, always asking whether the decision falls within a range of reasonable outcomes [Doré, at para.57; Loyala, at para. 41, citing RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1995 CanLII 64 (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 160). [para. 36]

 

 

 

It is difficult to ascertain whether a given decision that is required to balance Charter rights against legislative purpose is proportional without asking whether the decision falls within a range of reasonable outcomes. While the section 1 Oakes test is not applicable, the imperative of minimally impairing a Charter right is central to the proportionality analysis.

Another aspect of the decision that raises questions about the approach to expect in future cases is the Court’s treatment of context. The contextual approach to determining the standard of review has been clearly rejected. Reasonableness, even where Charter rights are implicated (other than a constitutional question), is the presumptive standard. However, context still plays a role in the way that a robust reasonableness review is conducted.

The majority states, “what is reasonable in a given situation will always depend on the constraints imposed by the legal and factual context of the particular decision under review” [para. 90]. However, it is also important to note that the majority in Trinity Western also stated that in the Charter context reasonableness and proportionality are synonymous, suggesting, perhaps, a different approach to the standard of reasonableness given that one could argue that proportionality requires a particular approach when assessing the impact on Charter protected rights.

While we appear to be stuck with Doré for the foreseeable future, that may not be a bad thing in light of the Court’s deferential approach to reasonableness in Vavilov. However, questions still remain under that approach as to who bears the onus for demonstrating the reasonableness of a decision, with the Courts generally requiring those challenging the decision to meet that onus. This leaves the individual alleging the breach of their Charter rights with the burden, unlike the onus on government under the Oakes test.

So, my short summary was that there are more questions than answers in respect of the implications of Vavilov for constitutional issues. Those questions for me include: What is a constitutional question? Does the interpretation of the Charter right invoke the standard of correctness or is an incorrect interpretation unreasonable? How will the context of a Charter claim alter the reasonableness standard, or will it? How will the proportionality analysis be conducted if the reviewer is not to examine alternative outcomes that could have been available? And, does the requirement of justification and the focus on reasons address any of the issues pertaining to onus that have been the subject of the criticism of Doré?

Cheryl Milne is the Executive Director of the David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights

[1] Macklin, Audrey, Charter Right or Charter Lite? Administrative Discretion and the Charter (October 9, 2014). Supreme Court Law Review, Vol 67, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2507801

[2] Liston, Mary, Administering the Charter, Proportioning Justice: Thirty-five Years of Development in a Nutshell Canadian Journal of Administrative Law & Practice; Toronto Vol. 30, Iss. 2, (Jun 2017): 211-246.

Dunsmuir Revisited: Questioning the Standard of Review

Posted on by Tal Schreier

by Catherine Ma

Earlier this month, the Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeals in Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v Alexander Vavilov, Bell Canada et al v Attorney General of Canada, and National Football League et al v Attorney General of Canada. The Supreme Court explicitly declared that these cases offered “an opportunity to consider the nature and scope of judicial review of administrative action” as set out in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick. The Supreme Court allowed 27 intervenors to make submissions on the issues, as well as appointed amici curiae to provide further insights.

It is impossible to overstate my initial excitement for this trilogy of cases. As a summer law student this past year, I assisted with the intervention by the Attorney General for Ontario, and I personally believe that the standard of review analysis needs reform. The current approach appears to be nothing more than an intellectual exercise. It fosters endless debate about the proper standard of review, diverting attention from the real impacts of administrative decisions. Yet, the law is about the experiences of individuals who must navigate the legal system, and the function of judicial review is ensuring that all individuals are treated fairly under the law.

My initial excitement increasingly faded as more factums were submitted; after the hearings, I lost all expectations of genuine reform. These cases narrowly focused on the standard of review applicable to an administrative decision-maker’s interpretation of a statute. The oral submissions for Bell Canada and NFL and Vavilov discussed piecemeal adjustments to the current approach to the standard of review, such as establishing a new category where a standard of correctness would apply and eliminating the category of “true questions of jurisdiction.” The parties obsessed over whether the standard of review should change in light of statutory rights to appeal and/or a decision-maker’s level of independence from the legislature.

I found it interesting that the parties only made fleeting references to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in their factums, as the impact of many administrative decisions on individuals’ Charter and human rights is often profound. Counsel for Mr. Vavilov mentioned that the impugned decision had “enormous importance,” as having citizenship would mean that Mr. Vavilov had a Charter right to enter and remain in Canada. During oral submissions, his counsel Barbara Jackman asserted that a standard of correctness must apply to administrative decisions that involve human rights. She explained that such issues engage the Charter, and “deference is not part of the constitutional scheme.” The courts must be the ultimate decision-maker due to the significance of those decisions.

The amici curiae remarked that a standard of correctness should apply when decisions implicate the Charter since the courts must have the “last word” on interpretations of the Charter and purported infringements of Charter rights [79-82].

The intervenor Community & Legal Aid Services Programme (CLASP) provided the most comprehensive submission regarding the Charter. It advocated for a “nuanced approach” that would consider the nature of a decision, the nature of the decision-maker, the nature of the decision-making process, and the Charter right at issue in order to determine the proper standard of review.

In light of the relative silence around the Charter, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court of Canada will adjust the standard of review as it pertains to administrative decisions that implicate the Charter. I suspect that the Supreme Court of Canada will only make minor tweaks to the current approach to the standard of review, leaving the Doré / Loyola framework untouched.

[Click on picture for link to archived webcast of SCC hearing on Dec 4, 2018]

 

Catherine Ma is a 3L JD Candidate at the Faculty of Law and was a student leader of the Asper Centre’s Indigenous Rights student working group in 2017-2018.  She was a summer law student at the Ministry for the Attorney General in 2018. 

Beyond freedoms: the administrative underbelly of the Trinity Western decision

Posted on by Student

By Sara Tatelman

The Supreme Court of Canada may have divided 7-2 on whether law societies must accredit Trinity Western University’s proposed law school, but the split was much narrower when it came to the nitty-gritty of administrative law. While the five-justice majority accepted the Doré/Loyola framework for judicial review of administrative law decisions, the other four justices called for varying degrees of reform.

The Doré framework applies when courts are reviewing the constitutionality of an administrative decision, such as one by a human rights tribunal, an immigration and refugee board, or a law society. Reviewing courts give considerable deference to the original decision-maker, given their subject matter expertise, and only over-turn their decisions if they are not reasonable.

On the other hand, when courts are determining whether a Charter-infringing law is nonetheless constitutional, the Oakes test applies. Unlike Doré, it clearly places the onus of proving the law is proportional on the government.

“The framework set out in Doré and affirmed in Loyola is not a weak or watered down version of proportionality – rather, it is a robust one,” the majority wrote (para 80).

“But saying [the framework is robust] does not make it so,” Côté and Brown J.J. snapped back in their dissent (para 304).

McLachlin C.J. (concurring) and Rowe (concurring), Côté and Brown (dissenting) J.J. all argued that judicial review of administrative law decisions should ask whether an individual’s Charter rights were infringed, rather than the more nebulous Charter values of the Doré framework and the majority’s decision. While rights are clearly outlined in constitutional documents, the majority suggests Charter values are those “the state always has a legitimate interest in promoting and protecting,” such as democracy, equality and human rights (para 41, citing Loyola at para 47).

Furthermore, rights are clearly distinct from other values. “To denominate an interest as a right is to recognize its normative primacy,” the Asper Centre noted in its 2013 intervention in Divito v. Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. “As such, a Charter right intrinsically ‘weighs’ more (by virtue of being a right) than something called an interest, value or entitlement. A Charter right, once established, also possesses normative priority. A rights bearer need not justify protection of a Charter right; rather, the state must justify infringing it.”

Côté and Brown J.J. pointed out that Charter values are unsourced, amorphous and undefined, subject to each judge’s personal interpretation and nothing but “mere rhetorical devices by which courts can give priority to particular moral judgements” (para 309).

The dissenting (Côté and Brown J.J.) and the concurring (McLachlin C.J. and Rowe C.J., in separate in decisions) justices were divided over whether the Doré framework was salvageable. The latter argued it was, as they saw strong parallels between Doré and Oakes.

Under Doré, the decision maker must find reasonable the balance between the Charter values and the statutory objective, which of course involves identifying that objective, Rowe J. wrote. This corresponds to the first step of the Oakes test, which is ensuring the rights-infringing statute has a sufficiently pressing and substantial objective.

The second step of Doré is determining whether the decision proportionately balanced the relevant Charter protections, he added. This corresponds to the proportionality test in Oakes, which analyzes rational connection, minimal impairment and the balance between beneficial and deleterious effects.

McLachlin C.J. added that the Doré analysis usually comes down to the minimal impairment and balancing questions.

The dissenting justices, however, were troubled there was no clear rationale as to why judicial review of administrative decisions requires a separate framework. They noted courts had used the Oakes analysis before Doré was decided, as well as several times since.

“… [T]he orthodox test — the Oakes test — must apply to justify state infringements of Charter rights, regardless of the context in which they occur,” Côté and Brown J.J. wrote. “Holding otherwise subverts the promise of our Constitution that the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter will be subject only to “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified” (para 304).

The four justices were once again united when the question of burden of proof came up. They all found Doré, which has remained “conspicuously silent” on that issue (para 195), especially unsatisfactory in this regard.

In most administrative law decisions, applicants shoulder the burden of proof. But in Charter disputes, the four justices argue – as did the Asper Centre in Attorney General of Canada on behalf of the Republic of India v. Surjit Singh Badesha — that the justificatory burden must fall to the state actor. Otherwise, the Doré framework would provide significantly less protection than Oakes (para. 117, 197, 313).

And that, surely, is intolerable. As McLachlin C.J. wrote, “Canadians should not have to fear that their rights will be given different levels of protection depending on how the state has chosen to delegate and wield its power” (para 116).

Sara Tatelman is the Asper Centre’s 2018 summer research assistant.