National Security

Bill C-59: The Good, the Bad, and Where We’re At

Posted on by Tal Schreier

By Patrick Enright

When Bill C – 51, the Federal Government’s revised Anti-Terrorism Act, was pushed through Parliament following the attacks on Parliament Hill in 2015, the reaction from the public and civil liberties societies was swift. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association challenged key provisions of the Act under the Charter, and Professors Roach and Forcese (among others) wrote numerous articles decrying the law as “radical” and “unbalanced.” It also became a hot topic of debate in what turned out to be a contentious Federal Election, one that saw the Liberals win a surprising majority over Harper’s conservative flagship.

But when the dust settled from the election season, the question loomed large: would the Liberals take any action to reform the new law? At the time, there was reason to be skeptical. The law had received Royal Assent with support from both the Conservative and Liberal parties. And with the election of the U.S. chest-pounder-in-chief, Donald Trump, many thought the Liberals would shy away from anything that might portray them as either soft on terror or weak on national security matters.

So when the Liberals introduced Bill C – 59, An Act Respecting National Security Matters, there was reason to believe it would be a mere nodding attempt to keep a half-hearted campaign promise. In some ways the Bill does disappoint – and the Asper Centre has released a detailed analysis of its shortcomings. But in many ways it is a valiant effort to roll back some of Bill C-51’s glaring excesses.

The most obvious improvement in the legislation is the implementation of a multi-agency review mechanism. The new bill sets up a whole-of-government review committee that can assess and review all national security information (except Cabinet confidences) and produces frequent classified reports to Parliament as well as an annual unclassified report to the public regarding its findings. These provisions remedy a major deficiency in accountability that has been lacking for years in Canada’s national security framework. Until now, each national security agency had different oversight bodies, which could not collaborate with each other, despite the fact that the work of each agency is often intertwined. This created a “siloing” effect, where reviewing bodies could not follow the evidence down whatever rabbit hole it may have led. By contrast, the new “whole of government” mandate means that the entirety of Canada’s national security apparatus can be held accountable for its actions, including the CBSA (Canadian Border Services Agency) which had previously not been subject to any independent review.

The Bill is commendable in other areas as well. For example, Bill C – 51 introduced a new speech offence to the Criminal Code that made it an offence to “advocate or promote a terrorism offence in general.” The provision is breathtaking in scope. It makes it an offence to perform tasks as innocuous as promoting the assistance of designated terrorist groups, advocating for the provision of “material aid” to listed groups, and advocating for the provision of charitable aid to a listed terrorist organization. There were also no defences worked into the provision such as opinions in the furtherance of a religious belief, commentary on matters of public interest, or the articulation of truth.

Bill C – 59, to its credit, limits the scope of this offence to actions that actually “counsel” a terrorist activity. This is important because “counselling” criminal activity has always been a Criminal Code Offence – one that has been upheld as constitutional under the Charter.

All this being said, the Bill is not a model of perfection. The Liberals have come up at least one base short of a legislative home run. Canada’s national security framework remains sorely lacking in the area of privacy protection in that it still permits an enormous amount of sharing of Canadians’ personal information between federal agencies. As of now, the broad collection and sharing of Canadians’ personal information is authorized if the information pertains to acts that might “undermine the security of Canada.”

While this might sound perfectly reasonable, it is in fact alarming when one looks at the definition of what “undermines the security of Canada.” The category includes such unremarkable matters as interference with the economic or financial stability of Canada as well as any effort to “unduly influence” the government of Canada by any “unlawful means.” The term “unlawful,” it should be noted, is not the same thing as “criminal.” Canadians’ private information can be swept up and shared on the grounds that the target of the information had contravened an act of Parliament in an effort to merely “influence” government action (think of violations of the Ontario Labour Relations Act). Bill C-59 does nothing to remedy these deficiencies.

So what has been the progress on Bill C – 59? The Bill is currently being prepared for Second Reading in Committee, so there is still hope that modifications could be made. But there is no guarantee that changes to the bill won’t move in a less happy direction. The Progressive Conservatives, under their new leader Andrew Scheer, have made a habit of taking the Liberals to task on any matter that has the appearance of being “soft on terror,” including the management of returning ISIS fighters and – most controversially – the 10-million-dollar settlement with Omar Khadr. The Conservatives also appear to have taken issue with the restrictions on CSIS’s so-called threat reductions powers. Bill C – 51 made it legal for CSIS agents to take positive steps to reduce national security threats short of causing bodily harm, intruding on sexual integrity or obstructing justice. It also allowed CSIS to seek a warrant from courts that would authorize Charter violations. Bill C – 59 changes this. The Liberal government has reformed these provisions by requiring that all such actions be Charter compliant, and prohibits CSIS agents from using its powers to detain, torture, or damage property to the extent that it endangers life.

These are important changes, but it is not obvious that the Liberals will be able to pass it into law without a fight. For this reason, when it comes to debating the bill in second reading, one hopes that Liberals and Conservatives will come together to strike an appropriate balance between national security matters and rights-preservation.

In other words, that cooler heads might prevail.

Patrick Enright is a 3L JD Candidate at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law and was a 2016 Asper Centre Clinic student.

A Preliminary Look at Bill C-59 and its Implications on Canadian Privacy Rights

Posted on by Tal Schreier

By Natasha Anzik

 

The Liberals’ new national security legislation, Bill C-59, was tabled in the House of Commons on June 20th, 2017. The ten-part, 139-page legislation has taken a robust look at the current state of Canadian national security, proposing many changes and additions, but still leaves several gaps in the protection of Canadian privacy rights.

Last December the Asper Centre’s Privacy and National Security Working Group made a submission to the Department of Public Safety Canada and to the Department of Justice. This submission primarily dealt with the Charter implications of warrantless access to basic subscriber information, but also considered data retention and systems of review. Bill C-59 has also been criticized for its failure to address issues with regard to the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, including its overbroad definition of security and the vast amount of information sharing permitted. While not discussed here, or as part of the Asper Centre’s submission, it is evidence of the breadth of issues that remain unresolved.

Basic Subscriber Information

The Asper Centre’s submission was made in response to Bill C-51 and the 2016 National Security Green Paper and called for several reformations to the accessibility of basic subscriber information (BSI) in order to be compliant with s. 8 of the Charter. BSI can simply be a name, address, telephone number, and matching an IP address. This seemingly unremarkable information, the working group argued, should be protected from warrantless access as the combination of this information can lead to inferences about an individual’s registered services, interests, organizational affiliations, and geographic location and therefore may engage one’s s. 8 Charter rights.

Issues were raised with respect to the Green Paper’s suggested lower evidentiary requirements for obtaining lawful access to BSI, and how this lower standard would run counter to the spirit of s. 8, which protects against unlawful searches. This argument was supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v Spencer, which holds that subscriber information can carry a high expectation of privacy, and disclosure of this information is vulnerable to Charter challenges. As this decision was specific to Internet subscriber information, the working group recommended a consistent standard for the sharing, retention, and destruction of personal information across different platforms. Consistency across all law enforcement agencies would also help prevent backdoor information sharing. Another issue raised by the working group is that the metadata regime of the Criminal Code has historically been unclear, and interpreted to suggest that communications service providers can readily disclose subscriber information. The Asper Centre thus advocated for a federal law that clearly prohibits the voluntary disclosure of subscriber information by telecommunications companies, and requires judicial authorization for access.

The need for clarification of this area of law was echoed in the 2016 Green Paper. While the paper called for a clear law governing access to this information, Bill C-59 is notably silent on this issue. Although not considered now, its inclusion in the Green Paper suggests this issue will be addressed in future legislation, meanwhile this area of law will likely remain inconsistent and problematic for the privacy protection of Canadians.

While Bill C-59 does not address BSI specifically, the issue of access to information comes up in the regulation of the Communication Security Establishment’s (CSE) activities. The CSE is an intelligence network, focused on gathering information to protect Canada’s cyber security from external threats. The Bill provides for a large expansion of the powers of the CSE, but also provides several restrictions recognizing the potential for these expanded powers to engage the s.8 privacy rights of Canadians. One restriction includes limiting the CSE from directing their activities at Canada and people in Canada, but this does not prevent the agency from acquiring “publicly available information”, defined as information that can be made available upon request. Although the government argues that publicly available information would inherently have a lower expectation of privacy and therefore not engage s.8 of the Charter, this information could potentially include BSI that is voluntarily released by communication service provides. This allowance therefore could lead to privacy issues as described above. As the state of lawful access remains in flux, Canadians will remain vulnerable. These provisions will also be problematic in how they might inform the treatment of BSI in future legislation.

Systems of Review

One of the most prominent parts of the new Bill is its creation of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA). The current system of review was an area of concern raised by the Asper Centre’s submission. The criticism focused on the limited powers of review allocated to the Privacy Commissioner and the review agencies for CSIS, the RCMP, and the CSE. This system not only creates a silo effect between agencies, but also demands increased resources and understanding to sufficiently oversee the mass of information in and between national security agencies. Bill C-59 addresses this issue and the need for increased accountability and public confidence in its creation of the NSIRA. Outlined in the Bill’s Charter Statement, the job of the NSIRA would be to “review and report in an integrated manner on the lawfulness of all national security and intelligence activities across government, thereby enhancing accountability, transparency and the safeguarding of human rights in Canada.” Part 2 of the Bill would also establish a quasi-judicial Intelligence Commissioner, who would review certain decisions regarding intelligence gathering. These new review systems seem promising in their ability to rectify the lack of broad oversight, to increase accountability, and to correct the current silo effect.

Data Retention

The Asper Centre’s submission also encouraged the establishment of a scheme of data retention that maintains a balance between Canada’s national security interests and privacy protections. The Asper Centre discouraged mandatory minimum retention schemes and unlimited information sharing between agencies, and argued that these data retention schemes should have a system of independent review for the use of information once obtained. Bill C-59 does not address this issue at length, but does allow the limited retention of datasets, which require judicial authorization that is valid for no more than two years. Dataset use must also be “strictly necessary”, and will be subject to review by the Intelligence Commissioner. While this change does not fully address all the concerns of the Asper Centre, it is a step forward in the establishment of a more robust scheme of information storage that hopefully will be refined to ensure further Charter compliance.

 

While this Bill has made strides with respect to the Asper Centre’s concerns, there are still some gaping holes with respect to the privacy protections afforded to Canadians. It seems unlikely that lawful access to basic subscriber information will be addressed in the passing of Bill C-59, as this was an issue at the attention of legislators as part of the Green Paper consultation process, but was actively excluded in the drafting of the Bill. Hopefully the review process of the Bill will lead to further clarification of the powers of the CSE in collecting information, how basic subscriber information relates to “publicly available information,” and may engage s. 8 of the Charter. These issues will have the potential to be raised to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security this fall.

Natasha Anzik is the Asper Centre’s summer research assistant and an upcoming 2L JD Candidate at the Faculty of Law.

Asper Centre Director Cheryl Milne to moderate a panel discussion in upcoming University of Toronto Faculty of Law Symposium: Reforming Criminal Justice and National Security

Posted on by wsg_admin

Hosted by U of T Faculty of Law and Supported by the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation.  Co-sponsored by the Criminal Law Quarterly and the Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy Group, Global Justice Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs

Tuesday May 30, 2017
University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 84 Queens Park, Solarium
10 am-5pm with reception to follow

This symposium is designed to produce a special double issue of the Criminal Law Quarterly that will reflect on the processes and challenges of reforming criminal justice and national security.

The aim is to examine specific contexts of pressing concerns that may be the subject of anticipated legislation including expected amendments to Ontario’s Police Services Act, expected amendments to the Criminal Code and expected amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015 and related national security legislation.

The symposium is designed to bring academics, policy-makers and practitioners together for frank and open discussion of matters of common concern and pressing importance.

The symposium will end with a panel on general reflections about the process of criminal justice and national security reform.

The Symposium is free but registration is required. To register click on the registration form below.

See the Symposium agenda (PDF)

Registration form

For more information, contact michelle.rosenstock@utoronto.ca