Challenging Quebec’s Secularism Bill despite its use of s.33

by Jeffrey Wang

On June 16th, 2019, Quebec passed An Act respecting the laicity of the State (Bill 21). This bill was controversial for banning the wearing of religious symbols, such as hijabs, niqabs, turbans and kippahs, for some public employees, including some teachers and public servants with state-sanctioned power to exercise coercive authority, such as police and prosecutors. It also contains the notwithstanding clause. One day after its adoption, the CCLA and National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM) filed an application to stay the application of Bill 21. The claimants present five fascinating arguments on the unconstitutionality of Bill 21 despite its override on Charter rights.

Firstly, the applicants claim that Bill 21 is ultra vires. According to Saumur, Henry Birks, and Big M Drug Mart, the regulation of religious observance for a moral purpose is the sole jurisdiction of Parliament. As stated in its preamble, the purpose of Bill 21 is to affirm the laicity of the State. In addition, s.6 and s.8 of Bill 21 can be considered criminal legislation, both with prohibitions and sanctions.

Secondly, the applicants argue that Bill 21 is impermissibly vague as to violate the rule of law. Particularly, Bill 21 defines religious symbol as something that is worn for a religious purpose or something that can be reasonably considered religious. Both definitions are vague. Firstly, people can wear the same item for different reasons – wedding bands, for example, have religious significance to some but not others. Dressing modestly can have religious significance to Muslim women and wearing hats can have religious significance to Jewish men. Moreover, since there are so many religions within Canada, it is impossible to identify all religious symbols. Thus, it will depend on the knowledge of individual people to identify symbols covered by Bill 21. In addition, enforcement is also left to individual organizations. This will create a chaotic and arbitrary environment in which each organization will allow and disallow different items, with different consequences. The rule of law mandates that people know the prohibitions and penalties of a law in advance, which Bill 21 clearly violates.

Thirdly, the applicants argue that Bill 21 modified the architecture of the Canadian constitution by changing the inclusive nature of public institutions. In the Secession Reference, the SCC recognized respect for minority rights as an organizing constitutional principle. Thus, unilaterally altering this principle is impermissible. The applicants argue that interference with certain rights may violate the basic constitutional architecture even without the Charter. For example, pre-1982, if a government had barred religious minorities from voting, this would have unconstitutionally altered Canadian democracy. Similarly, respect for minority rights within Canada’s democracy means that all citizens can participate in public institutions, regardless of the notwithstanding clause. Bill 21 violates this principle.

Fourthly, the applicants argue that Bill 21 affects judicial independence. S.3 of Bill 21 applies to judicial institutions, yet s.5 exempts Superior Court judges and Court of Appeal judges from complying with laicity. With respect to the judges that Bill 21 does not exempt, this infringes the requirements of judicial independence by imposing a requirement that subjects them to discipline. Under s.100 of the BNA Act, the state cannot impose a condition that impacts a judge’s security of tenure. The applicants further argue that many other actors within the judicial institution, such as clerks, justices of the peace, sheriffs, etc., must still comply with the act. Since these actors play such as important role within the legal system, they are also subject to the guaranteed administrative independence of the courts.

Fifth, starting at paragraph 156, the applicants argue that the application of Bill 21 to elected officials violates s.3 of the Charter. S.3 of the Charter includes the right to qualify for membership in the House of Commons or a provincial legislature. By applying s.8 of Bill 21 to elected officials, it excludes individuals who cover their face from this membership. The applicants argue that this is not justified under s.1 since state laicity is not a pressing objective and a total ban is not a minimal impairment of rights.

The decision of Justice Michel Yergeau was released on July 18, 2019, denying the stay. Justice Yergeau did not focus on the constitutional aspects of the case, but rather deferred to interlocutory injunction procedures. Referencing past case law, he notes that “constitutional disputes are not…amenable to the expeditious and informal procedure of the interlocutory injunction”[1] and that “only a trial judge will be able to [decide on the merits of the constitutional arguments].”[2] Yergeau J’s decision is currently being appealed.

Regardless of the outcome, the claimant’s arguments show that although the Charter thoroughly protects our rights, our constitutional culture of rights protection has evolved beyond the Charter’s parameters. Even without the Charter, citizens can turn to federalism and the unwritten constitution to continue to seek protection from majoritarian rule. The results of the stay may have direct consequences for future uses of s.33, which may no longer be seen as the legal “get-out-of-jail-free” card for the legislature.

Read the CCLA’s factum here.

[1] Hak c. Procureure générale du Québec, 2019 QCCS 2989, para 58

[2] Ibid, para 146

Jeffrey Wang is a 2L JD Candidate at the Faculty of Law.

Procedural delays prevent constitutional answers in B.C. Medicare case

By Sara Tatelman

It is a truth universally acknowledged that a first-year law student in possession of a jam-packed schedule must be in want of an excuse to skip Legal Process class. But as we see in Cambie Surgeries Corporation v. British Columbia (Attorney General), both ignorance and careful manipulation of the smallest rules of civil procedure lead to months- and even years-long delays before pressing constitutional questions will be answered. So 1Ls, skip at your peril.

Cambie Surgeries centres on British Columbia’s ban of most private healthcare. The plaintiffs – two private clinics owned by Dr. Brian Day and four patients – argue the unconstitutionality of three provisions of B.C.’s Medicare Protection Act: prohibition of private duplicate insurance, limits on extra billing, and preventing doctors from being paid by both the provincial Medical Services Plan and directly by patients. They argue that by preventing private billing, the province forces patients to suffer as they languish on waiting lists. They allege this infringes their s. 7 Charter right to security of the person, and the fact that some residents have access to expedited private medicine through workers’ compensation and government-run auto insurance infringes other British Columbians’ s. 15 equality rights.

The trial began in September 2016, was adjourned in April 2017 partly due to the plaintiff running out of funds and partly due to inefficient presentation of evidence, and re-commenced on April 9, 2018.

Between February and April 2018 alone, British Columbia filed eight interim motions. Seven sought to strike parts of various witness’s affidavits, while one sought to enforce Cambie Surgeries’ compliance with a previous disclosure order.

Such evidentiary disputes aren’t new: in an April 2017 interim judgement, Justice John Steeves noted that half of the 70+ days of the trial had been devoted to argument over expert witnesses. In an interview with the Canadian Press, Dr. Day said the government delays were an attempt to bleed him dry and force him to abandon his suit.

Between March and May 2018, Steeves J. released 11 interim judgements responding to the parties’ very particular quibbles. Most of the motions sought to strike expert witness affidavits in whole or in part. Steeves J. assessed the impugned statements one by one, concluding that some are admissible because they derive from the witness’s direct experience and observations while others are inadmissible because they include hearsay evidence or opinion.

The line between description and argument can be fine: stating that many patients will deteriorate as they wait for treatment is admissible, but stating that surgery gets more challenging the later it occurs is not (2018 BCSC 759 para 11). Similarly, in another judgement, some comments that might be described as opinion were held to be admissible descriptions of the physician’s work, such as his statement that efforts made at the hospital will be insufficient to meaningfully reduce his waitlist (2018 BCSC 760 para 26).

In another motion, British Columbia sought to enforce Cambie Surgeries’ compliance with a previous order. Specifically, Cambie Surgeries hadn’t produced documents it had been ordered to, and allegedly redacted 55 documents without any explanation. It also failed to list documents it didn’t have in its possession or control, as well as to include any information about privilege, all of which violates the Supreme Court Civil Rules. Steeves J. ordered Cambie Surgeries to provide unredacted copies of certain documents, an amended list of all relevant documents, and an affidavit from Dr. Day that all relevant documents have been disclosed. “… The amended list of documents will comply with the Rules by indicating the documents or classes of documents for which privilege is claimed,” Steeves J. said. “Following discussions and argument I think counsel now understands what that means.”

It’s been almost two years since the Cambie Surgeries trial began, and while a CanLII search yields nearly 50 interim decisions, we’re nowhere near a final judgement. Maybe that’s because British Columbia is disputing the smallest points in the hopes that Dr. Day, drained of his assets and mortgaged to the hilt, will slink away, taking his Charter challenge with him. Maybe that’s because Cambie Surgeries’ lawyers are making disclosure mistakes that would cost them points on a 1L Legal Process exam. Whatever’s causing the delays, and whatever one’s thoughts on privatized medicine in the Canadian healthcare system, it’s clear that the complexities of civil procedure aren’t helping the country get an answer to an important constitutional question.

Sara Tatelman is the Asper Centre’s 2018 summer research assistant.

Bill C-59: The Good, the Bad, and Where We’re At

By Patrick Enright

When Bill C – 51, the Federal Government’s revised Anti-Terrorism Act, was pushed through Parliament following the attacks on Parliament Hill in 2015, the reaction from the public and civil liberties societies was swift. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association challenged key provisions of the Act under the Charter, and Professors Roach and Forcese (among others) wrote numerous articles decrying the law as “radical” and “unbalanced.” It also became a hot topic of debate in what turned out to be a contentious Federal Election, one that saw the Liberals win a surprising majority over Harper’s conservative flagship.

But when the dust settled from the election season, the question loomed large: would the Liberals take any action to reform the new law? At the time, there was reason to be skeptical. The law had received Royal Assent with support from both the Conservative and Liberal parties. And with the election of the U.S. chest-pounder-in-chief, Donald Trump, many thought the Liberals would shy away from anything that might portray them as either soft on terror or weak on national security matters.

So when the Liberals introduced Bill C – 59, An Act Respecting National Security Matters, there was reason to believe it would be a mere nodding attempt to keep a half-hearted campaign promise. In some ways the Bill does disappoint – and the Asper Centre has released a detailed analysis of its shortcomings. But in many ways it is a valiant effort to roll back some of Bill C-51’s glaring excesses.

The most obvious improvement in the legislation is the implementation of a multi-agency review mechanism. The new bill sets up a whole-of-government review committee that can assess and review all national security information (except Cabinet confidences) and produces frequent classified reports to Parliament as well as an annual unclassified report to the public regarding its findings. These provisions remedy a major deficiency in accountability that has been lacking for years in Canada’s national security framework. Until now, each national security agency had different oversight bodies, which could not collaborate with each other, despite the fact that the work of each agency is often intertwined. This created a “siloing” effect, where reviewing bodies could not follow the evidence down whatever rabbit hole it may have led. By contrast, the new “whole of government” mandate means that the entirety of Canada’s national security apparatus can be held accountable for its actions, including the CBSA (Canadian Border Services Agency) which had previously not been subject to any independent review.

The Bill is commendable in other areas as well. For example, Bill C – 51 introduced a new speech offence to the Criminal Code that made it an offence to “advocate or promote a terrorism offence in general.” The provision is breathtaking in scope. It makes it an offence to perform tasks as innocuous as promoting the assistance of designated terrorist groups, advocating for the provision of “material aid” to listed groups, and advocating for the provision of charitable aid to a listed terrorist organization. There were also no defences worked into the provision such as opinions in the furtherance of a religious belief, commentary on matters of public interest, or the articulation of truth.

Bill C – 59, to its credit, limits the scope of this offence to actions that actually “counsel” a terrorist activity. This is important because “counselling” criminal activity has always been a Criminal Code Offence – one that has been upheld as constitutional under the Charter.

All this being said, the Bill is not a model of perfection. The Liberals have come up at least one base short of a legislative home run. Canada’s national security framework remains sorely lacking in the area of privacy protection in that it still permits an enormous amount of sharing of Canadians’ personal information between federal agencies. As of now, the broad collection and sharing of Canadians’ personal information is authorized if the information pertains to acts that might “undermine the security of Canada.”

While this might sound perfectly reasonable, it is in fact alarming when one looks at the definition of what “undermines the security of Canada.” The category includes such unremarkable matters as interference with the economic or financial stability of Canada as well as any effort to “unduly influence” the government of Canada by any “unlawful means.” The term “unlawful,” it should be noted, is not the same thing as “criminal.” Canadians’ private information can be swept up and shared on the grounds that the target of the information had contravened an act of Parliament in an effort to merely “influence” government action (think of violations of the Ontario Labour Relations Act). Bill C-59 does nothing to remedy these deficiencies.

So what has been the progress on Bill C – 59? The Bill is currently being prepared for Second Reading in Committee, so there is still hope that modifications could be made. But there is no guarantee that changes to the bill won’t move in a less happy direction. The Progressive Conservatives, under their new leader Andrew Scheer, have made a habit of taking the Liberals to task on any matter that has the appearance of being “soft on terror,” including the management of returning ISIS fighters and – most controversially – the 10-million-dollar settlement with Omar Khadr. The Conservatives also appear to have taken issue with the restrictions on CSIS’s so-called threat reductions powers. Bill C – 51 made it legal for CSIS agents to take positive steps to reduce national security threats short of causing bodily harm, intruding on sexual integrity or obstructing justice. It also allowed CSIS to seek a warrant from courts that would authorize Charter violations. Bill C – 59 changes this. The Liberal government has reformed these provisions by requiring that all such actions be Charter compliant, and prohibits CSIS agents from using its powers to detain, torture, or damage property to the extent that it endangers life.

These are important changes, but it is not obvious that the Liberals will be able to pass it into law without a fight. For this reason, when it comes to debating the bill in second reading, one hopes that Liberals and Conservatives will come together to strike an appropriate balance between national security matters and rights-preservation.

In other words, that cooler heads might prevail.

Patrick Enright is a 3L JD Candidate at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law and was a 2016 Asper Centre Clinic student.

A Preliminary Look at Bill C-59 and its Implications on Canadian Privacy Rights

By Natasha Anzik


The Liberals’ new national security legislation, Bill C-59, was tabled in the House of Commons on June 20th, 2017. The ten-part, 139-page legislation has taken a robust look at the current state of Canadian national security, proposing many changes and additions, but still leaves several gaps in the protection of Canadian privacy rights.

Last December the Asper Centre’s Privacy and National Security Working Group made a submission to the Department of Public Safety Canada and to the Department of Justice. This submission primarily dealt with the Charter implications of warrantless access to basic subscriber information, but also considered data retention and systems of review. Bill C-59 has also been criticized for its failure to address issues with regard to the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, including its overbroad definition of security and the vast amount of information sharing permitted. While not discussed here, or as part of the Asper Centre’s submission, it is evidence of the breadth of issues that remain unresolved.

Basic Subscriber Information

The Asper Centre’s submission was made in response to Bill C-51 and the 2016 National Security Green Paper and called for several reformations to the accessibility of basic subscriber information (BSI) in order to be compliant with s. 8 of the Charter. BSI can simply be a name, address, telephone number, and matching an IP address. This seemingly unremarkable information, the working group argued, should be protected from warrantless access as the combination of this information can lead to inferences about an individual’s registered services, interests, organizational affiliations, and geographic location and therefore may engage one’s s. 8 Charter rights.

Issues were raised with respect to the Green Paper’s suggested lower evidentiary requirements for obtaining lawful access to BSI, and how this lower standard would run counter to the spirit of s. 8, which protects against unlawful searches. This argument was supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v Spencer, which holds that subscriber information can carry a high expectation of privacy, and disclosure of this information is vulnerable to Charter challenges. As this decision was specific to Internet subscriber information, the working group recommended a consistent standard for the sharing, retention, and destruction of personal information across different platforms. Consistency across all law enforcement agencies would also help prevent backdoor information sharing. Another issue raised by the working group is that the metadata regime of the Criminal Code has historically been unclear, and interpreted to suggest that communications service providers can readily disclose subscriber information. The Asper Centre thus advocated for a federal law that clearly prohibits the voluntary disclosure of subscriber information by telecommunications companies, and requires judicial authorization for access.

The need for clarification of this area of law was echoed in the 2016 Green Paper. While the paper called for a clear law governing access to this information, Bill C-59 is notably silent on this issue. Although not considered now, its inclusion in the Green Paper suggests this issue will be addressed in future legislation, meanwhile this area of law will likely remain inconsistent and problematic for the privacy protection of Canadians.

While Bill C-59 does not address BSI specifically, the issue of access to information comes up in the regulation of the Communication Security Establishment’s (CSE) activities. The CSE is an intelligence network, focused on gathering information to protect Canada’s cyber security from external threats. The Bill provides for a large expansion of the powers of the CSE, but also provides several restrictions recognizing the potential for these expanded powers to engage the s.8 privacy rights of Canadians. One restriction includes limiting the CSE from directing their activities at Canada and people in Canada, but this does not prevent the agency from acquiring “publicly available information”, defined as information that can be made available upon request. Although the government argues that publicly available information would inherently have a lower expectation of privacy and therefore not engage s.8 of the Charter, this information could potentially include BSI that is voluntarily released by communication service provides. This allowance therefore could lead to privacy issues as described above. As the state of lawful access remains in flux, Canadians will remain vulnerable. These provisions will also be problematic in how they might inform the treatment of BSI in future legislation.

Systems of Review

One of the most prominent parts of the new Bill is its creation of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA). The current system of review was an area of concern raised by the Asper Centre’s submission. The criticism focused on the limited powers of review allocated to the Privacy Commissioner and the review agencies for CSIS, the RCMP, and the CSE. This system not only creates a silo effect between agencies, but also demands increased resources and understanding to sufficiently oversee the mass of information in and between national security agencies. Bill C-59 addresses this issue and the need for increased accountability and public confidence in its creation of the NSIRA. Outlined in the Bill’s Charter Statement, the job of the NSIRA would be to “review and report in an integrated manner on the lawfulness of all national security and intelligence activities across government, thereby enhancing accountability, transparency and the safeguarding of human rights in Canada.” Part 2 of the Bill would also establish a quasi-judicial Intelligence Commissioner, who would review certain decisions regarding intelligence gathering. These new review systems seem promising in their ability to rectify the lack of broad oversight, to increase accountability, and to correct the current silo effect.

Data Retention

The Asper Centre’s submission also encouraged the establishment of a scheme of data retention that maintains a balance between Canada’s national security interests and privacy protections. The Asper Centre discouraged mandatory minimum retention schemes and unlimited information sharing between agencies, and argued that these data retention schemes should have a system of independent review for the use of information once obtained. Bill C-59 does not address this issue at length, but does allow the limited retention of datasets, which require judicial authorization that is valid for no more than two years. Dataset use must also be “strictly necessary”, and will be subject to review by the Intelligence Commissioner. While this change does not fully address all the concerns of the Asper Centre, it is a step forward in the establishment of a more robust scheme of information storage that hopefully will be refined to ensure further Charter compliance.


While this Bill has made strides with respect to the Asper Centre’s concerns, there are still some gaping holes with respect to the privacy protections afforded to Canadians. It seems unlikely that lawful access to basic subscriber information will be addressed in the passing of Bill C-59, as this was an issue at the attention of legislators as part of the Green Paper consultation process, but was actively excluded in the drafting of the Bill. Hopefully the review process of the Bill will lead to further clarification of the powers of the CSE in collecting information, how basic subscriber information relates to “publicly available information,” and may engage s. 8 of the Charter. These issues will have the potential to be raised to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security this fall.

Natasha Anzik is the Asper Centre’s summer research assistant and an upcoming 2L JD Candidate at the Faculty of Law.

Bill C-23 leaves cross-border travelers vulnerable to Charter rights infringements

By Natasha Anzik

Bill C-23, the Preclearance Act, was recently amended by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security and passed to the Senate on June 21, 2017. The bill establishes many new preclearance areas in Canada to be staffed by U.S. officers in order to clear travelers through customs prior to crossing the border. Canadian officials will conversely work in preclearance zones in the U.S. This bill is designed to expand border preclearance, expediting travel and the movement of goods between our two countries. Concerns have arisen with respect to the amount of power granted to U.S. officials on Canadian soil and how their actions will be held accountable under Canadian law. Although many recommendations to rectify the potentially unconstitutional aspects of the Act were made to the Standing Committee, they were insufficiently adopted in the Committee’s amendments. Consequently, if enacted in its current form, the bill will expose border crossers to many potential violations of their Charter rights.

Bill C-23 was conceived in 2016 in response to the Agreement on Land, Rail, Marine, and Air Transport Preclearance signed by the Canadian and U.S. governments. It was first tabled in the House of Commons on June 17, 2016, and was referred to the Standing Committee in March of 2017. The Asper Centre made several arguments concerning the bill’s constitutionality in its submissions to the Committee including recommendations to scale back the expanded powers granted to U.S. authorities to question, search, and possibly detain travelers entering the United States. The Asper Centre’s submission focused on three major issues: preclearance officers’ power to search and detain, the protection of digital privacy rights, and the lack of meaningful remedies.

The Asper Centre was the only organization to make an argument for increased digital rights protections in preclearance zones. Courts have consistently held that one’s expectation of privacy is significantly diminished at the border, as it is reasonably expected for travelers to be screened. Items such as luggage and purses are classified as “imported goods” and are subject to searches absent reasonable suspicion. The Asper Centre urged the Committee to classify digital devices as distinct from imported goods in order to afford these devices more protection due to the intimate and singular nature they play in our lives.

Under the current law, travelers who wish to withdraw from preclearance may do so at any time, no questions asked. Bill C-23 introduces a new process of withdrawal, outlined in s.30, which states that to withdraw from preclearance travelers must answer truthfully to any questions pertaining to their identification or reasons for withdrawing, and must comply with direction given by preclearance officers. The Asper Centre, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA), and the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) all raised issues with this provision’s potential to create a situation of arbitrary detention contrary to s. 9 of the Charter. Under this new legislation, travelers would not feel free to walk away from preclearance, creating a reasonable perception of detention. Each group also discussed several other rights engaged by this provision including: the right to be informed of the reasons for detention, the right to counsel, and the right to silence.

Granting U.S. officers the power to conduct strip searches was also a point of contention. S. 22 of the bill affords this power to U.S. officers if Canadian officials are either unwilling or unavailable to conduct the search. Both the BCCLA and the CBA noted that strip searches are prima facie violations of the Charter, and submitted that this power should not be granted to U.S. officers. The CBA recommended that only Canadian officers be allowed to execute strip searches.

The Asper Centre considered the power to conduct strip searches in light of the fact that there are insufficient remedies for rights violations within the bill. An unlawful strip search engages s. 8 of the Charter, but American authorities are immunized from any civil claims under the State Immunity Act unless they cause death or serious bodily injury. In order for a psychological harm to be covered it must rise to the level of nervous shock. Further, since U.S. officers are not considered servants of the Crown, Canada could not be held accountable for any rights violations. This potentially precludes remedies in the form of damages, declaratory relief, and any other means deemed appropriate under s. 24(1) of the Charter. While the BCCLA recommended clarification of how the U.S. will be held to compliance, the Asper Centre took this one step further, recommending that the full range of Charter and Canadian Human Rights Act remedies be made available against the US for actions of preclearance officers in the fulfillment of their duties.

The Standing Committee’s amendments made several clarifications to various terms used in the Act in addition to establishing a system of independent review of the Act five years after its enactment. Several additions were more pertinent to the constitutional concerns raised, such as the addition of s. 11(1) which declares that, “A preclearance officer must exercise their powers and perform their duties and functions under this Act in accordance with Canadian law, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Canadian Human Rights Act.” While this amendment is a nod to the constitutional issues raised to the Committee, it insufficiently protects the rights of travelers. American authorities remain immunized under the State Immunity Act, therefore it would seem unlikely that any action can be taken against them unless their actions cause serious injury or death. The lack of remedial action means there is no check on the requirement outlined in s.11. As Chief Justice McLachlin has previously asserted: “a right, no matter how expansive in theory, is only as meaningful as the remedy provided for its breach.”

The other significant addition made to Bill C-23 was the addition of s. 11(2), which states, “The Minister must…provide every preclearance officer with training on the Canadian law that applies to the exercise of the preclearance officer’s powers and the performance of their duties and functions under this Act.” This was an issue that was raised by the BCCLA, which urged that the government ensure that preclearance officers be properly trained so as to prevent violations of Canadian law. The amendments do not address the issues of preclearance detention, digital privacy rights, or strip searches, however.

The rights protection concerns in preclearance areas are especially salient due to the current state of Canada-U.S border immigration. There has been consistent coverage in the media of incidents of Canadians being turned away at the border as a result of seemingly discriminatory practices. The Ontario Human Rights Commission recently released a report documenting the impact of racial profiling in a number of contexts, and stories of Canadians having digital devices searched extensively at the border are commonplace in the news. The amendments made to Bill C-23 leave many holes in the protections afforded to travelers in preclearance areas. The current trends are alarming, and this Act will only exacerbate these current issues. Most notably, the lack of remedies available for harms caused by the unlawful actions of U.S. officers leaves their increased powers unchecked, and travelers vulnerable to violations of their Charter rights. Bill C-23 was passed to the Senate on June 21, and will hopefully be met with some rational objections.


Natasha Anzik is the Asper Centre’s summer research assistant and an upcoming 2L JD Candidate at the Faculty of Law.