Asper Centre Cases

The Asper Centre regularly intervenes in cases of constitutional significance heard at the Supreme Court of Canada or at provincial Courts of Appeal. 

2026

2025

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2010

 


Attorney General of Ontario et. al. v. Cycle Toronto et. al.

This appeal addresses whether a provision in Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act requiring the removal of bike lanes on portions of Yonge Street, University Avenue, and Bloor Street in Toronto violates section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In November 2024, the Ontario Legislative Assembly passed Bill 212, or the Reducing Gridlock, Saving You Time Act, which blocked municipalities from building new bike lanes on streets where those lanes would reduce lanes available to auto traffic. It also directed the removal of certain bike lanes in Toronto. Cycle Toronto, Eva Stanger-Ross, and Narada Kiondo, launched a Charter challenge against the legislation in December 2024. In July 2025, Justice Paul Schabas of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice ruled that the impugned provisions were unconstitutional, leading the Ontario government to appeal. The Asper Centre intervened in this appeal to argue that the Court should abandon the notion that a particular Charter right is inherently positive or negative on the basis that all Charter rights in practice require both state restraint and state action for their meaningful realization. The Ontario Court of Appeal is scheduled to hear the appeal on January 28, 2026.


Attorney General of Québec v. Luamba

This appeal concerns whether a police power authorizing random traffic stops without any grounds violates the Charter, particularly in light of systemic racial discrimination in policing. The case raises important questions about how section 15(1) of the Charter — the equality guarantee — applies to laws that have disproportionate effects on racialized communities. The Asper Centre’s intervention focuses on how section 15(1) can be used to address systemic racism. It argues that racial profiling is not an isolated problem but an inevitable by-product of discretionary policing powers, and that the state has a constitutional duty to counteract this bias. The Centre urges the Court to reaffirm the principle of substantive equality by adopting a clear, positive definition of the concept — one that requires the state to avoid giving legal force to historic disadvantage. It further submits that laws granting broad, groundless police powers are constitutionally defective when they enable expected forms of discrimination.

Asper Centre Factum

His Majesty the King v. Harry Arthur Cope

This appeal concerns the appropriate sentence for an Indigenous defendant and whether the trial judge properly applied the constitutionally mandated Gladue principles. In its intervention, the Asper Centre  emphasized that judges must consider the unique systemic and background factors affecting Indigenous individuals, as outlined in R v. Gladue and R v. Ipeelee. The Asper Centre argued that the trial judge failed to adequately apply these principles, which are constitutionally mandated under Section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code. It contended that the failure to consider these factors resulted in a sentence that did not reflect the principles of restorative justice and reconciliation, and urged the Supreme Court to provide guidance on the proper application of Gladue principles in sentencing.

Asper Centre Factum


English Montreal School Board, et al. v. Attorney General of Quebec, et al.

This appeal challenges the constitutionality of Québec’s Bill 21, which prohibits certain public employees from wearing religious symbols at work. In this intervention, the Asper Centre argued that courts retain the power and, in some cases, the obligation to engage with Charter claims even when legislation is shielded by a Section 33 (“notwithstanding clause”) declaration. The Centre emphasized that s. 33 does not oust judicial review, alter the underlying rights, or prevent courts from issuing declaratory judgments regarding rights violations, and that courts may exercise this authority under s. 24(1), s. 52(1), or inherent jurisdiction. It highlighted that declaratory relief provides access to justice, informs public debate, and preserves the dialogue between courts and legislatures, particularly when pre-emptive s. 33 declarations affect minorities or vulnerable groups. By clarifying the constitutionality of legislation during the period of a s. 33 override, courts can uphold constitutional principles, judicial independence, and the rule of law, ensuring that the use of s. 33 does not eliminate meaningful judicial oversight.

Asper Centre Factum


Mathur v. His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario

This appeal challenges the adequacy of Ontario’s climate policies and whether they infringe the Charter rights of youth and future generations. In its intervention, the Asper Centre addressed how remedies under Section 24(1) of the Charter can meaningfully vindicate Canadians’ rights when state action contributes to climate change. The Centre emphasized that novel issues, such as climate harms, require flexible and effective remedies, including declaratory relief, orders directing the government to adopt science-based greenhouse gas targets, and retention of the courts’ supervisory jurisdiction to ensure compliance. It argued that declaratory relief alone may be insufficient, and that courts can constitutionally provide guidance to the executive without overstepping the separation of powers. By leveraging Section 24(1) powers and, where appropriate, ongoing supervisory oversight, courts can ensure that Charter violations in the climate context are remedied in a manner that is practical, enforceable, and capable of protecting the rights of present and future generations.

Asper Centre Factum


Attorney General of Québec v. Kanyinda

This appeal addresses whether Quebec’s exclusion of refugee claimants from accessing subsidized daycare violates Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In 2018, Bijou Cibuabua Kanyinda, a Congolese asylum seeker, arrived in Quebec with her three children and was granted a work permit. She sought subsidized daycare but was denied because Quebec’s Reduced Contribution Regulation excluded individuals awaiting refugee status. The Quebec Court of Appeal ruled that this exclusion disproportionately affects women, particularly those seeking asylum, and constitutes discrimination based on sex. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify the scope of equality rights under Section 15, especially concerning access to public services for individuals based on immigration status. The Asper Centre intervened in this appeal in conjunction with NAWL (the National Assosciation of Women and the Law) to argue that the Court should endorse an intersectional analysis of s. 15(1) of the Charter and clarify that a distinction can be demonstrated with evidence of either quantitatively disproportionate impact or qualitatively differential treatment.

Asper Centre and NAWL Factum

Mikhail Kloubakov, et al. v. His Majesty the King 

This appeal will determine the constitutionality of two Criminal Code sex work provisions. Both impugned provisions were introduced in the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (“PCEPA”), which Parliament enacted following the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2013 decision in Bedford. The first provision at issue in Kloubakov is the “material benefit” offence (section 286.2), which prohibits individuals from receiving a financial or other material benefit which they know came from the purchase of sexual services, subject to several exceptions (set out in section 286.2(4)) and exceptions to those exceptions (set out in section 286.2(5)).  The second impugned provision is section 286.3, which prohibits procuring, recruiting, harbouring, or exercising control over someone for the purpose of selling their sexual services. The Alberta Court of Appeal held that both provisions were constitutional.  The Asper Centre’s intervention focused on the framework for the section 7 analysis. The Asper Centre submitted that specific provisions within a legislative scheme must be read consistently with the overarching purposes of the scheme. In the context of the PCEPA, this means that all provisions must be consistent with the objective of protecting sex workers’ safety. The Asper Centre also argued that illusoriness can be understood in terms of instrumental rationality. If defences fail to eliminate the very criminal liability which they were intended to remove, then they will effectively be underboard (and therefore failures of instrumental rationality). Applied to the PCEPA, the Asper Centre contended that – to the extent that the defences provided for in section 286.2(4) deny sex workers’ access to safety measures – they are illusory. Special thanks are owed to Gerald Chan and Stephen Aylward from Stockwoods LLP, who are acting as counsel for the Asper Centre in Kloubakov. 

Asper Centre Factum

Attorney General of Ontario v Working Families Coalition (Canada) Canada Inc. et al. 

This case concerns whether third party spending limits on political advertising in Ontario infringe the informational component of the right to vote (i.e., a citizen’s right to exercise their vote in an informed manner), which is protected by s. 3 of the Charter. In 2017, the Ontario government amended the Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7 to impose, for the first time, spending limits on third party political advertising. It expanded the definition of political advertising to include issue-based ads, and restricted third party political advertising in the 6-month period leading up to the issuance of the writ of election. While a constitutional challenge to these restrictions was underway, the government further amended the legislation to extend the restriction to 12 months before the writ of election without increasing the $600,000 spending limit. The Asper Centre intervened in this appeal arguing that the enactment of greater restrictions on the informational component of the section 3 right to vote under the Charter is a relevant and important factor in assessing whether the right is infringed and whether the infringement is justified. Further, a change in legislation is highly relevant at the minimal impairment stage of the section 1 analysis. When legislation is modified to impose greater restrictions on Charter rights, the previous version of the legislation provides another alternative that was more minimally impairing of the right at issue. Thus, there is a serious question of whether Ontario has met its burden under section 1 and demonstrated that the previous version of the legislation did not achieve the government’s purpose in a real and substantial manner.

Asper Centre Factum

Decision of the SCC

Slepcsik v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

Mr. Slepcsik challenged the constitutionality of ss. 40.1 and 46(1)(c.1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) which provide for the automatic loss of permanent resident (PR) status, inadmissibility, and removal following a cessation decision. The case concerned whether this automatic loss of PR status violates sections 7, 15, 12 and 2(d) of the Charter. Under these provisions, PRs who arrived in Canada as refugees can be stripped of their status for a series of reasons set out in s. 108, including where “the person has voluntarily re-availed themselves of the protection of their country of nationality” (s. 108(1)(a)).

Before the Federal Court, the Asper Centre focused its submissions on s. 108(1)(a), arguing that the automatic loss of PR status after returning to one’s country of nationality (“re-availment”) offends section 12. The Asper Centre first contended that revoking PR status amounts to “punishment” or, alternatively, “treatment” within the meaning of section 12. The Asper Centre then argued that the punishment was grossly disproportionate as applied to reasonable hypothetical rights-holders. The gross disproportionality analysis considers three factors: the conduct which triggers the punishment, the punishment itself, and the punishment’s connection to recognized sentencing principles. Drawing on reported cases, the Asper Centre noted that loss of PR status has been triggered by individuals returning to their country of origin for significant family events like funerals or to care for ill loved ones. In terms of the impact on rights-holders, the Asper Centre stressed that the affected refugees have already had to overcome numerous challenges associated with settling in Canada, including learning a new language and building a family. This is incompatible with human dignity since it ignores the person’s humanity, focusing only on their refugee status when they arrived in Canada. Finally, the impugned provisions bear no relation to recognized sentencing principles. Contrary to the IRPA‘s objectives of facilitating refugee’s social and economic well-being by reunification with relatives in Canada, taking away PR status undermines their social, economic, and family networks.

Asper Centre Factum


York Regional District School Board v. Elementary Teachers’ Federation of Ontario 

The facts of this case concern teachers’ privacy rights in Ontario. A discipline grievance was brought in by a teachers’ federation of Ontario on behalf of two elementary school teachers. The teachers claim that their privacy rights under section 8 of the Charter have been violated when the principal accessed their “log” an online application where they recorded concerns about another teacher allegedly receiving preferential treatment. At the appeal level, the court allowed the appeal, thereby reversing the arbitrator’s decision that quashed the two teachers’ grievances. The Asper Centre intervened to provide further insight on the appropriate approach that the court should adopt in their Charter rights analysis. Focusing on both